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Article 
The Omega Man or the Isolation of U.S. Antitrust Law 
SPENCER WEBER WALLER 
There is a classic science fiction novel and film that present a metaphor for the 
isolation of United States antitrust law in the current global context. Richard 
Mathiesson’s 1954 classic science fiction novel, I am Legend, and the later 1971 
film released under the name of The Omega Man starring Charleton Heston, both 
deal with the fate of Robert Neville, a survivor of a world-wide pandemic who 
believes he is the last man on Earth. 
While I am Legend and The Omega Man are obviously works of fantasy, it 
nonetheless has resonance for contemporary antitrust debate and discourse. United 
States antitrust law and policy diverges significantly from the rest of the global 
antitrust community in important areas of scope, philosophy, doctrine, procedure, 
remedies, and institutions. Much of this divergence in world view is the product of 
history and path dependence that is largely unique to the United States experience. 
At the same time, some of the divergence is the result of ideological choices over the 
past forty years that improbably have remained in place in the United States, while 
other politics, economics, values, and policy choices have come into prominence 
throughout the rest of the world. 
Unlike The Omega Man, there is no plague and there are no monsters. But 
there are major fault lines in competition law and policy where the United States is 
the outlier and in danger of becoming The Omega Man. While there are also many 
issues of agreement where the United States has been a thought leader, there are a 
significant number of the most salient and controversial issues in modern 
competition law where the United States is choosing to go it alone or nearly so. 
There are some important caveats to this tale of antitrust exceptionalism. Some 
of the United States antitrust exceptionalism means more enforcement than 
elsewhere in the world. In most of the areas discussed in this article, it means less 
enforcement that is seen elsewhere, particularly than in the European Union and 
the numerous jurisdictions whose competition law is modeled on EU principles. Nor 
does going it alone, or being in the minority, mean that the United States position 
necessarily is in error, but it does caution against demonizing foreign approaches 
or relentlessly searching to transplant U.S. approaches into very different societies. 
 
This Article surveys several significant areas of antitrust law and policy where 
United States law, procedure, institutions, and remedies differ significantly from the 
rest of the world. The basic thesis of the Article is that the growing isolation of U.S. 
antitrust law is more than just a transatlantic divide. Rather, much of the global 
community understands U.S. antitrust law and policy, but has rejected its current 
narrow form in favor of a broader vision of what competition law means, what legal 
rules are appropriate, and how they should be enforced. Even in areas such as 
mergers and cartels, outward convergence often masks critically different practices 
just beneath the surface. 
As a result, the debate over the future of the Chicago School is largely moot. 
Examining what the rest of the world competition community actually does, rather 
what it says, shows the debate is largely over. Whether measured by numbers of 
jurisdiction, percentage of world gross domestic production, population, or most 
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The Omega Man or the Isolation of U.S. Antitrust Law 
SPENCER WEBER WALLER * 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a classic science fiction novel and film that presents a metaphor 
for the isolation of United States antitrust law in the current global context. 
Richard Matheson’s 1954 classic science fiction novel I Am Legend,1 and 
the later 1971 film released under the name of The Omega Man starring 
Charlton Heston,2 both deal with the fate of Robert Neville, a survivor of a 
world-wide pandemic who believes he is the last man on Earth. 
Humankind has been destroyed by a war and subsequent plague that 
resembles vampirism. Neville lives in post-apocalyptic Los Angeles in a 
heavily fortified house further protected by garlic, mirrors, and crucifixes. 
For years, he confronts only mindless vampires who seek his destruction. 
Neville defends himself from attacks during the night hours and uses the 
daytime to scavenge for supplies, kill vampires, and search for a cure to the 
plague. 
He eventually discovers there are in fact rational survivors. Humans, 
infected by the plague, have been turned into a different type of vampire, 
largely allergic to daylight. They have formed a new nighttime society also 
seeking a cure or treatment for their condition. After a series of uneasy 
contacts and misunderstandings between Neville and members of the new 
society, Neville’s home is attacked by members of the new society. In the 
ensuing struggle, Neville kills members of the group and is eventually 
captured. 
                                                                                                                     
* John Paul Stevens Chair in Competition Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Thanks 
to Christopher Dempsey, Emily Eggmann, Krystyna Kudlata, and Frances Butler for their research 
assistance and to Amedeo Arena, Darren Bush, Ariel Ezrachi, James Gathii, Philip Marsden, Matthew 
Sag, Christopher Sagers, Maurice Stuke, as well as participants at workshops at Loyola University 
Chicago; Centre for Competition Law & Policy, Oxford University; New Zealand Commerce 
Commission; and the U.K. Competition and Markets Authority for their comments and feedback. 
1 RICHARD MATHESON, I AM LEGEND (1954). 
2 THE OMEGA MAN (Walter Seltzer Productions 1972). The Omega Man was later remade in 2007 
under the name I Am Legend starring Will Smith, with important changes that make it both less interesting 
and less relevant as a metaphor to themes explored in this Article. I AM LEGEND (Warner Bros. 2007). 
Richard Matheson also wrote, under a pseudonym, the screenplay for a 1964 film version titled The Last 
Man on Earth. THE LAST MAN ON EARTH (Associated Producers Inc. 1964). There is an additional 2007 
straight to video version entitled I AM OMEGA. I AM OMEGA (The Asylum 2007). The 1954 I Am Legend 
novel also has been described as an inspiration for George Romero’s classic zombie film Night of the 
Living Dead. John Casteele, George Romero Invented the Modern Zombie Horror Genre, SCREENRANT 
(July 22, 2017), https://screenrant.com/george-romero-death-tribute-zombies/. 
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As he awaits execution, he realizes that civilization did not end, it just 
evolved in unexpected ways. While he originally viewed the new struggling 
civilization as monsters, they, in fact, viewed him the same way. Parents in 
the new civilization used him as a sort of boogey man to warn children who 
never knew any other world to avoid straying too far from home or into the 
daylight. Rather than a survivor of old humanity, he is now an evil legend to 
the new race born of the infection. As he spends his final moments, he 
realizes that he has become “a new superstition entering the unassailable 
fortress of forever. I am legend.”3 
While I Am Legend and The Omega Man are obviously works of fantasy, 
they nonetheless have resonance for contemporary antitrust debate and 
discourse. United States antitrust law and policy diverges significantly from 
the rest of the global antitrust community in important areas of scope, 
philosophy, doctrine, procedure, remedies, and institutions. Much of the 
divergence in worldview is the product of history and path dependence that 
is largely unique to the United States experience. At the same time, some of 
the divergence is the result of ideological choices over the past forty years 
that improbably have remained in place in the United States, while other 
politics, economics, values, and policy choices have come into prominence 
throughout the rest of the world. 
Unlike in The Omega Man, there is no plague,4 and there are no 
monsters. But there are major fault lines in competition law and policy where 
the United States is the outlier and in danger of becoming The Omega Man. 
While there are also many issues of agreement where the United States has 
been a thought leader, there are a significant number of the most salient and 
controversial issues in modern competition law where the United States is 
choosing to go it alone or nearly so. 
There are some important caveats to this tale of antitrust exceptionalism. 
Some of the United States antitrust exceptionalism means more enforcement 
than elsewhere in the world. In most of the areas discussed in this Article, it 
means less enforcement than is seen elsewhere, particularly than in the 
European Union and the numerous jurisdictions whose competition law is 
modeled on EU principles. Nor does going it alone, or being in the minority, 
mean that the United States’ position is necessarily in error, but it does 
caution against demonizing foreign approaches or relentlessly searching to 
transplant U.S. approaches into the approaches of very different societies. 
This Article surveys several significant areas of antitrust law and policy 
where United States law, procedure, institutions, and remedies differ 
                                                                                                                     
3 MATHESON, supra note 1, at 170. 
4 But see Spencer Weber Waller, The Law and Economics Virus, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 367, 369 
(2009) (using “the metaphor of the virus to capture the dynamics of how the Chicago School [analysis 
of antitrust regulation] has spread by penetrating a new area of the law, replicating itself, and transmitting 
itself to new host bodies of law or legal jurisdictions”). 
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significantly from the rest of the world. The basic thesis of the Article is that 
the growing isolation of U.S. antitrust law is more than just a transatlantic 
divide.5 Rather, much of the global community understands U.S. antitrust 
law and policy, but has rejected its current narrow form in favor of a broader 
vision of what competition law means, what legal rules are appropriate, and 
how they should be enforced. Even in areas such as mergers and cartels, 
outward convergence often masks critically different practices just beneath 
the surface. 
As a result, the debate over the future of the Chicago School is largely 
moot. Examining what the rest of the world competition community actually 
does, rather than what it says, shows the debate is largely over. Whether 
measured by number of jurisdictions, percentage of world gross domestic 
production, population, or most other measures, the Chicago School 
paradigm is the outlier, the Omega Man. 
Part I examines single firm conduct as perhaps the most significant and 
largest area of substantive divergence between the United States and the rest 
of the world. Part II shifts to the scope of competition law where U.S. 
antitrust law simply does not capture a wide variety of conduct and tools that 
form the core competition law in much of the world. Part III looks at the 
widespread use of market studies and market investigations where the 
United States lacks the legal infrastructure to undertake what is routine in 
key jurisdictions around the globe. Part IV explores how competition law 
outside the United States may include public interest standards that fall 
outside the narrow focus of U.S. antitrust law and enforcement. Part V 
examines similar key divergences in public enforcement, remedies, and 
private enforcement. Part VI questions why the United States antitrust 
agencies have largely shied away from the implications of big data and 
algorithmic competition which are attracting more significant attention 
abroad. Part VII changes the focus from descriptive to normative and offers 
preliminary explanations as to the reasons for the growing isolation of 
United States antitrust law and how both the United States and the rest of 
the world can respond to this growing divide. I conclude by returning to the 
question of whether the United States is indeed the Omega Man of global 
competition law. 
I. ABUSING DOMINANCE 
One of the more significant areas of divergence between the rest of the 
world and the United States relates to the treatment of unilateral conduct that 
is harmful to competition. As a matter of terminology, the United States 
                                                                                                                     
5 For a comparative analysis on antitrust law in the United States and abroad, see DANIEL J. 
GIFFORD & ROBERT T. KUDRLE, THE ATLANTIC DIVIDE IN ANTITRUST: AN EXAMINATION OF US AND 
EU COMPETITION POLICY (2015), and D. Daniel Sokol, Troubled Waters Between U.S. and European 
Antitrust, 115 MICH. L. REV. 955, 955–97 (2017). 
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refers to this area of antitrust law as monopolization while the EU and most 
of the rest of the world refers to this as abuse of dominance. Growing 
isolation of U.S. antitrust is particularly timely given the growing number of 
high profile EU and member state investigations and complaints against U.S. 
tech giants such as Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Facebook where the 
United States took narrower, or no, enforcement action against them for the 
same behavior attacked in the EU and elsewhere. 
A. The Narrow Scope and Interpretation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
Part of the difference stems from the language and history of each 
system. The substantive language of section 2 of the Sherman Act remains 
unchanged since its adoption in 1890 and prohibits monopolization, 
attempted monopolization, and conspiracies to monopolize.6 
While there is no single test for section 2 liability articulated by the 
United States Supreme Court, certain general principles have emerged. 
Liability for monopolization requires proof of both monopoly power and 
some conduct that tends to exclude competition on some basis other than 
competition on the merits.7 
Monopoly power has been defined as the power to raise prices or 
exclude competition.8 It can be proven through direct evidence of the ability 
to increase prices or that competition has in fact been excluded.9 
Alternatively, monopoly power can be proven indirectly through the 
definition of a relevant market in which the defendant holds a substantial 
market share of a durable nature.10  
Monopoly power is necessary, but not sufficient, to find a violation of 
section 2. The black letter law also requires proof of some conduct which 
tends to eliminate competition through some act which is either unlawful or 
                                                                                                                     
6 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
7 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) (“The offense of monopoly under 
§ 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market 
and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development 
as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”); United States v. 
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429–32 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding that for there to exist a monopoly 
under section 2, there must be an intent to monopolize by the alleged harmful competitor). 
8 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). 
9 FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986). 
10 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992) (“The existence of 
such power ordinarily is inferred from the seller’s possession of a predominant share of the market.” 
(internal citations omitted)); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957) 
(“Determination of the relevant market is a necessary predicate to a finding of a violation of the Clayton 
Act because the threatened monopoly must be one which will substantially lessen competition ‘within 
the area of effective competition.’”). Cf. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES 7–11 (2010), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf (setting forth market 
definition tests for merger enforcement under section 7 of the Clayton Act). 
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exclusionary.11 Examples of such conduct include behavior which lacks any 
legitimate or non-pretextual business justification; lacks economic sense 
except for its exclusionary effect; violates some other portion of the antitrust 
laws; or where the harm to competition substantially outweighs any 
proffered pro-competitive justification.12 
The Supreme Court has described monopoly power in more positive 
terms in its 2004 Trinko opinion stating: 
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant 
charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an 
important element of the free-market system. The opportunity 
to charge monopoly prices–at least for a short period–is what 
attracts “business acumen” in the first place; it induces risk 
taking that produces innovation and economic growth.13 
The EU approach to the abuse of a dominant position begins with the 
very different notion of a “special responsibility” of dominant firms to 
refrain from further diminishing competition.14 Although the precise scope 
and meaning of this special responsibility has been debated, and has evolved 
since the founding of EU competition in the 1950s, it continues to be 
reaffirmed in the recent decisions of the European Court of Justice and the 
European Commission.15 In addition, the EU has applied from time to time 
a concept of abuse of dominance “by object,” akin to a per se violation of 
Article 102—something which is unknown in U.S. monopolization law.16 
                                                                                                                     
11 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 (1966) (finding that defendants held a 
monopoly through unlawful and exclusionary practices). 
12 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 410 (2004) (holding 
that Verizon’s insufficient assistance to its rivals is not a basis for an antitrust claim); Eastman Kodak 
Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482–86 (1992) (affirming summary judgment against the 
antitrust defendant because there were factual questions regarding the validity and sufficiency of each 
claimed justification); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608–11 (1985) 
(affirming trial court’s finding that ski company maintained unlawful monopoly in part because it failed 
to offer any business justification whatsoever for its pattern of conduct). See generally WILLIAM C. 
HOLMES & MELISSA H. MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 3:5 (2018-19 ed.) (collecting 
cases). 
13 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407. 
14 Case AT.39740, Google Search (Shopping), ¶ 331 (2017), 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_14996_3.pdf [hereinafter EU 
Google Search]; Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sveirge AB, 2011 E.C.R. I-527, 582–
83; Case C-202/07, France Télécom SA v. Comm’n, 2009 E.C.R. I-2369, 2391–92.  
15 Case C-413/14, Intel Corp. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:2016:788, ¶¶ 60, 118, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62014CC0413&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre=.  
16 See generally Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, Beyond the ‘More Economics-Based Approach’: A Legal 
Perspective on Article 102 TFEU Case Law, 53 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 709, 713–14 (2016); Nicolas 
Petit, From Formalism to Effects? – The Commission’s Communication on Enforcement Priorities in 
Applying Article 82 EC, 32 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 485, 500 (2009); Louis Vogel, Une 
nouvelle venue sur la scène du droit de la concurrence: la restriction par objet, CONTRATS - 
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This very different approach extends beyond the EU itself into the law 
of the twenty-eight member-states, the members of the European Free Trade 
Area, states that are bound to apply the principles of EU competition through 
preferential trade treaties, and those states which adopted similar provisions 
or interpretive principles into their own competition laws. As a result, there 
have been few takers for the U.S. cowboy-capitalism-deferential approach 
to the actions of dominant or monopoly firms.17  
B. Thresholds for Dominance Internationally 
The differences between the United States and the rest of the world 
begin almost at the inception of antitrust analysis involving conduct by 
powerful firms. As a rule of thumb in the United States, everything else 
being equal, a defendant with ninety percent or more of a well-defined 
market has monopoly power, a defendant with sixty-six percent or more may 
have such power, and a defendant with thirty-three percent would not.18  
There is a separate provision of section 2 that also prohibits attempts to 
monopolize. Proof of unlawful monopolization requires a showing of 
specific intent, unlawful or exclusionary conduct, and a probability of 
success.19 This provision has rarely been used successfully in recent years 
as seen in the Microsoft litigation and various private cases seeking treble 
damages in diverse industries.20 
 Most competition regimes outside the United States operate on a very 
different set of premises. Most systems involve prohibitions on the abuse of 
an existing dominant position rather than conduct seeking to acquire such a 
position. As the European Commission in the Google Search case noted: 
The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the 
behavior of an undertaking in a dominant position which is 
                                                                                                                     
CONCURRENCE - CONSOMMATION (Mai 2015) (Fr.) [Louis Vogel, A Newcomer to the Competition Law 
Scene: Restriction by Object, CONTS. - CONCURRENCE - CONSUMPTION (May 2015)]. 
17 Anu Bradford et al., The Global Dominance of European Competition Law Over American 
Antitrust Law 16 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 731, 734 (2019) (“Our analyses reveal that the majority of 
jurisdictions with competition law regimes have laws that more closely resemble the European Union’s 
competition laws than the United States’ antitrust laws. Moreover, our detailed data allows us to trace 
the evolution of EU and US influence over time. This analysis reveals that the European model of 
competition became more emulated than United States’ model in the 1990s, and the EU’s ‘sphere of 
influence’ in the domain of competition regulation has continued to increase ever since.”). 
18 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945). 
19 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993); Lorain Journal Co. v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 143, 153 (1951); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905). 
20 In the past five years, there have been thirty-two private antitrust cases which have cited to 
attempted monopolization, but only a few with any in-depth discussion of an attempted monopolization 
claim. See e.g., Duty Free Ams., Inc. v. Estee Lauder Cos., 797 F.3d 1248, 1263–68 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(discussing, in the rare instance, the elements and requirements of an attempted monopolization claim); 
Gulf States Reorg. Grp., Inc. v. Nucor Corp., 721 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2013) (articulating the 
elements a plaintiff must show to “establish a violation of § 2 for attempted monopolization”). 
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such as to influence the structure of a market where, as a result 
of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the degree 
of competition is weakened and which, through recourse to 
methods different from those which condition normal 
competition on the merits, has the effect of hindering the 
maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the 
market or the growth of that competition.21 
At the same time, the definition and thresholds for dominance differ 
significantly from the United States’ approach to the finding of monopoly 
power. Dominance is defined as the ability to act independently from 
competition, consumers, or competitors.22 Very large market shares, absent 
exceptional circumstances, are in themselves usually evidence of 
dominance.23 EU and member-state cases have found a rebuttable 
presumption of dominance at fifty percent market share,24 with occasional 
cases finding dominance with market shares of as low as forty percent, 
depending on such factors as the size of the other firms in the market, entry 
barriers, and any countervailing buyer power.25 
Outside the EU, a number of jurisdictions have similar presumptions of 
dominance based on market shares built into their laws, regulations, or 
guidelines. For example, China, Germany, South Africa, and Israel all have 
presumptions of market power or dominance in the range from thirty-five to 
fifty percent market share.26 Other countries such as Canada have guidelines 
which generally require further investigation where market shares exceed 
fifty percent and have recognized the existence of market power where the 
market shares were as low as thirty-three percent.27 
What emerges is a narrower set of firms subject to the strictures of 
section 2 than is the case for the rest of the world. This narrower U.S. lens 
                                                                                                                     
21 EU Google Search, supra note 14, ¶ 333. 
22 Id. ¶¶ 264–65; Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche & Co. v. Comm’n, 3 CMLR 211 (1979), ¶ 38; 
United Brands v. Comm’n, Case 27/76, 1 CMLR 429 (1978), ¶ 62 [hereinafter United Brands]. 
23 EU Google Search, supra note 14, ¶ 266; Hoffman-La Roche, supra note 22, ¶ 41. 
24 EU Google Search, supra note 14, ¶ 267; Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission, 
[1991] 5 C.M.L.R. 215, ¶ 60. 
25 Virgin/British Airways, 2000 O.J. (L 30/1) ¶ 88; Antitrust procedures in abuse of dominance 
(Article 102 TFEU cases), EUR. COMMISSION, ANTITRUST, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/procedures_102_en.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2019). 
26 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [GWB] [Act Against Restraints of Competition], 
June 26, 2013, Bundesgesetzblatt at 1750 2013 I, as amended by Article 1 of the law of June 1, 2017 
(Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gwb/englisch_gwb.html#p0029; Anti-monopoly 
Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 
30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 19 (China), http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-
02/20/content_1471587.htm; Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 7 (S. Afr.), http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/pocket-act-august-20141.pdf; Economic Competition Law, 5748-1988, 
Restrictive Trade Practices § 26 (Isr.). 
27 Government of Canada, Abuse of Dominance – Enforcement Guidelines at 12 (Mar. 14, 2018) 
(draft for public consultation), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04345.html. 
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for controlling the abuse of unilateral conduct also is reflected in the type of 
prohibited conduct itself. 
C. Excessive Pricing 
An important difference between section 2 and most competition law 
systems outside the United States lies in the treatment of high or excessive 
prices. While price increases may be evidence of the existence of monopoly 
power, these cannot be the basis for a finding of the unlawful or exclusionary 
conduct that is the second requirement for a section 2 violation. 
One reason is textual. Section 2’s prohibition of “monopolization” rather 
than “monopoly” requires something more than the possession of monopoly 
power. Modern courts have rejected older cases that hinted at the possibility 
of liability for no-fault monopolization.28 Section 2 thus requires some 
conduct that tends to exclude competition on some basis beyond superior 
skill, industry, and foresight.29 
By definition, this does not include merely charging high or excessive 
prices. Everything else being equal, charging high prices (without more) 
tends to allow current competition to flourish and invite new entry rather 
than exclude existing forms of competition. In addition, on policy grounds, 
the Supreme Court in Trinko identified the possibility of monopoly profits 
as an important incentive and reward for new entry and innovative new 
forms of competition.30 This alone provides a profound source of divergence 
with international practice, where in many key jurisdictions the unilateral 
excessive pricing of dominant firms may be an abuse of a dominant position 
often specifically referenced in the express text of the competition law or 
regulation. 
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) prohibits excessive prices as a form of abuse of dominance. Article 
102 states in relevant part: 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position 
within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be 
prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as 
it may affect trade between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
                                                                                                                     
28 See generally Milton Handler & Richard M. Steuer, Attempts to Monopolize and No-Fault 
Monopolization, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 125 (1980) (discussing no-fault monopolization). United States v. 
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948), is one case that modern courts have rejected. 
29 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
30 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004). 
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(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling 
prices or other unfair trading conditions . . . .31 
Excessive pricing cases have been part of the Article 102 jurisprudence 
since the earliest days of the EU. A price is found to be excessive where the 
price poses “no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product 
supplied.”32 In the seminal United Brands case, the European Court of 
Justice affirmed liability for excessive pricing as an unlawful abuse of 
dominance in circumstances where the dominant banana producer sold 
bananas in Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the Belgo-
Luxembourg Economic Union in excess of the prices where it sold 
equivalent products in Ireland.33 
United Brands is indicative of one line of excessive pricing cases in the 
EU. In such cases, the European Commission and the courts approach the 
case in the same manner as a price discrimination claim (also a violation of 
a different sub-part of Article 102),34 utilizing a comparison between time 
periods or comparable markets to determine whether prices are excessive.35  
The more complex cases are so-called “pure” excessive pricing cases 
where there are no readily comparable time periods or other markets to 
compare prices with those of the dominant firm. Recently, in the United 
Kingdom, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has challenged 
excessive pricing in the pharmaceutical industry in connection with sales to 
the National Health Service.36  
The first such case was brought against Pfizer and Flynn Pharma for 
excessive pricing in the sale of anti-epilepsy medication.37 Pfizer had 
previously manufactured the drug in the United Kingdom, but later gave 
such rights to Flynn. Pfizer sold to Flynn at prices higher than historically 
usual, and then Flynn would resell again at a higher than usual price. The 
CMA, in finding that both Flynn and Pfizer had charged excessive pricing, 
looked to the “economic value” test outlined in United Brands and found 
prices to be excessive based on the excessive rate of return of both 
companies.38 The Competition Appeals Tribunal reversed and remanded the 
                                                                                                                     
31 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 102, May 9, 
2009, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 01 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
32 United Brands, supra note 22, ¶ 250. 
33 Id. ¶¶ 159–62. 
34 TFEU art. 102. 
35 See infra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. 
36 Margherita Colangelo & Claudia Desogus, Antitrust Scrutiny of Excessive Prices in the 
Pharmaceutical Sector: A Comparative Study of the Italian and UK Experiences, 41 WORLD 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 225, 225 (2018); Harry First, Excessive Drug Pricing as an Antitrust 
Violation, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 701, 720–26 (2019). 
37 Case CE/9742-13, Unfair Pricing in Respect to the Supply of Phenytoin Sodium Capsules in the 
UK, Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) (Dec. 7, 2016). 
38 Id. §§ 5.9, 5.14. 
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CMA decision for further analysis and documentation of the excessive 
nature of the firms’ pricing.39 Most recently, the CMA issued a preliminary 
decision finding Advanz Pharma liable for excessive pricing of liothyronine 
tablets.40  
The European Union subsequently announced their own investigation 
into Aspen Pharma for the excessive pricing of certain cancer drugs.41 The 
UK Competition Markets Authority also has opened investigations into 
excessive pricing in the manufacture of liothyronine tablets and 
hydrocortisone tablets.42 
Excessive pricing claims exist outside the EU and its member states. 
Section 29a(b)(1) of the Israeli Antitrust Law states that a monopolist should 
not abuse their position, and that a monopolist shall be deemed to have 
abused its dominant position by establishing an unfair selling price.43 The 
2017 guidelines put forth by the Israeli Antitrust Authority confirm that 
setting an unfair price will be considered an abuse of a monopoly position.44 
The Israeli Guidelines allow the use of tests developed in other 
jurisdictions.45 These tests can include price comparisons with past prices, 
prices charged by rivals for similar goods, and profit comparisons to other 
firms manufacturing similar products.46  
Israeli litigation regarding excessive pricing began in 2011, with a case 
regarding the prices charged for cottage cheese.47 The case was certified as 
a class action in 2016 with the district court confirming that section 
29a(b)(1) does in fact apply in cases of excessive pricing.48 A different 
                                                                                                                     
39 Flynn Pharma Ltd. v. Competition & Mkts. Auth., [2018] CAT 11, 
http://www.catribunal.org.uk/files/1275-1276_Flynn_Judgment_CAT_11_070618.pdf. 
40 Carla Canivete, CMA Provisionally Finds Advanz Pharma Breached Competition Law, 
BLOOMBERG L. (June 30, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/mergers-and-antitrust/cma-
provisionally-finds-advanz-pharma-breached-competition-law-1. 
41 European Commission Press Release IP/17/1323, Antitrust: Commission Opens Formal 
Investigation into Aspen Pharma’s Pricing Practices for Cancer Medicines (May 15, 2017), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_1323. 
42 Press Release: Drug Company Accused of Abusing Its Position to Overcharge the NHS, GOV.UK 
(Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/drug-company-accused-of-abusing-its-position-
to-overcharge-the-nhs. A recent case in Spain found excessive pricing in the text messaging market, but 
that decision was overturned. Hettie O’Brien, Spanish Court Quashes Excessive Pricing Decision, 
GLOBAL COMP. REV. (Sept. 7, 2017), https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/1147175/spanish-
court-quashes-excessive-pricing-decision. 
43 Public Statement 1/17, The Antitrust Director General’s Considerations in Enforcing the 
Prohibition Against Unfairly High Prices (28/02/17) The Antitrust Authority 23, 
https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/legalInfo/opinion117. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 17. 
46 Id. 
47 Yossi Spiegel, Antitrust Enforcement of the Prohibition of Excessive Prices: The Israeli 
Experience, in EXCESSIVE PRICING AND COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT 127, 132–33 (Yannis 
Katsoulacos & Frédéric Jenny eds., 2018). 
48 Id. The case was scheduled for trial in the summer of 2018. Id. at 133. 
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Israeli district court in 2017 also certified a class action excessive pricing 
suit against Dead Sea Works, a provider of potash.49 The Israeli Supreme 
Court passed on the opportunity to determine whether section 29a(b)(1) 
makes excessive pricing unlawful in a case brought against a government-
approved monopoly in the production of natural gas.50  There have been 
nearly thirty such cases in Israel in a wide range of food and consumer 
products.51 
South Africa has taken an approach to excessive pricing that blends 
aspects of both the comparison and pure approaches. Section 8(a) of the 
South African Competition Act of 1998 prohibits a dominant firm from 
charging excessive price to the detriment of consumers or customers.52 In 
Competition Commission of South Africa v. Sasol Chemical Industries 
Limited, the Competition Tribunal of South Africa confirmed that section 
8(a) claims include the factual determination of the actual price alleged to 
be excessive, the economic value of the good or service, and lastly include 
the exercise of a value judgment as to the difference between the actual price 
and economic value and whether this difference is excessive to the detriment 
of consumers.53 The Commission also laid out three tests it would use to 
determine whether or not a price is excessive: the price-cost test (comparing 
the price of the good and the cost of production), the export price comparison 
(comparing the price charged of the good in the country versus others), and 
the geographic markets test (looking at what the firm charges in other 
markets).54 
The Competition Appeal Court of South Africa decided an excessive 
pricing case in 2009 involving a dominant steel firm.55 The court clarified 
that the analysis for excessive pricing in South Africa included two tests: the 
economic value test examining the cost of production versus the price of the 
good, and the reasonableness of the price in relation to the difference 
between price and cost.56  
In 2017, the South African Competition Commission announced that it 
would conduct excessive price investigations into numerous pharmaceutical 
                                                                                                                     
49 Id. at 133–34.  
50 Id. at 135. 
51 Michal S. Gal, The Case for Limiting Private Litigation of Excessive Prices, J. COMPETITION L. 
& ECON. at 18 (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3463386. 
52 Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 8(a) (S. Afr.). 
53 Competition Comm’n of S. Afr. v. Sasol Chem. Indus. Ltd.,2014 1 (Tribunal) at 13 para. 56, 31–
32 para.119–22 (S. Afr.). 
54 Id. at 32, 33 para. 130. South Africa also has acted against excessive pricing in the telecom sector. 
Renee Bonorchis, Vodacom Says Reviewing S. Africa Competition Report on Pricing, BLOOMBERG L. 
(Apr. 29, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/mergers-and-antitrust/vodacom-says-reviewing-s-
africa-competition-report-on-pricing. 
55 Mittal Steel S. Afr. Ltd. v. Harmony Gold Mining Co. Ltd. 2009 1 (CAC) at 1 (S. Afr.).  
56 Id. at 45 para. 43.  
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companies.57 Among those being investigated are Roche Holding AG for 
their provision of breast cancer medication, Pfizer for lung cancer 
medication, and Aspen for cancer medications.58 
Excessive or unfair pricing also is prohibited by section 17(1) of the 
Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).59 In 2013, 
two companies in the river sand industry were found to have unfairly high 
prices based on a comparison of prices and costs as well as a comparison of 
prices with other river sand markets.60 Most recently, the PRC agency 
enforcing this provision found Qualcomm liable for excessive pricing of 
certain intellectual property licenses and certain tying violations, with the 
case eventually settling with a fine of $975 million.61 
The point is not whether these cases are well founded on the law or the 
facts. Rather, it is to illustrate the first of numerous aspects of cases of 
unilateral conduct outside the United States that proceed on theories which 
the United States has rejected. 
D. Price Discrimination 
The forgotten stepchild of U.S. antitrust law is the Robinson-Patman Act 
which bars various forms of price discrimination. The Act’s principal 
provision forbids persons engaged in commerce: 
[T]o discriminate in price between different purchasers of 
commodities of like grade and quality . . . where the effect of 
                                                                                                                     
57 International Pharmaceutical Companies Investigated for Cancer Medicine Prices, 




59 Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, Presidential Order No. 68, ICAO (Aug. 
30, 2007, 6:32 PM), https://www.icao.int/sustainability/Documents/Compendium_FairCompetition/ 
China/Anti-monopoly-Law_China.pdf; see also David S. Evans et al., Assessing Unfair Pricing Under 
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law for Innovation-Intensive Industries 2 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., 
Working Paper No. 678, 2014), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https: 
//duckduckgo.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1668&context=law_and_economics (“Article 17(1) of 
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) prohibits dominant firms from ‘selling commodities at unfairly high 
prices or buying commodities at unfairly low prices.’” (internal citation omitted)).  
60 Adrian Emch et al., NDRC’s Antitrust Crackdown Continues and Its Scope Broadens, LEXOLOGY 
(Sept. 17, 2013), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=51109180-f406-48b1-9710-
d6acaeb1f413. 
61 See Stephen Harris, Jr., An Overview of the NDRC Decision in the Qualcomm Investigation, CPI 
2 ANTITRUST CHRON. (July 2015) (summarizing the Qualcomm decision). For discussion of the Anti-
Monopoly Law and Qualcomm’s liability, see Minkang, Anti-Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights 
Under the Anti-Monopoly Law: China’s Approaches, 10 FRONTIERS L. CHINA 488, 489 (2015), and Joe 
Zhang, China’s Antitrust Crackdown Hits Qualcomm with US$975 Million Fine: What Can Other Host 
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such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition 
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to 
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who 
either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such 
discrimination.62  
The Act provides certain limited defenses for cost-justified discounts and for 
meeting competition,63 and also contains anti-circumvention provisions.64 
There is even a criminal provision barring knowing violations of the Act for 
the purpose of “destroying competition, or eliminating a competitor.”65 
Despite decades of vigorous enforcement and expansive interpretation 
by the U.S. Supreme Court,66 the Robinson-Patman Act largely has become 
a dead letter. Neither the Federal Trade Commission nor the Justice 
Department have enforced the civil or criminal provisions in decades. 
Private civil enforcement has waned with the courts interpreting the 
language of the Act largely the same as the more restrictive provisions of the 
Sherman Act and imposing a variety of technical hurdles.67 Numerous critics 
have called for the abolition of some or all of the Robinson-Patman Act as 
against competitive norms and incompatible with the general tenor of the 
antitrust laws.68 
In contrast, price discrimination remains part of the competition tool kit 
outside the United States, particularly as a form of abuse of dominance. As 
previously discussed, Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union states that any abuse by a firm with a dominant position 
                                                                                                                     
62 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2012). 
63 Id. § 13(b). 
64 Id. § 13(c)–(e). 
65 Id. § 13a. 
66 See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702–03 (1967); FTC v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 542–45 (1960). 
67 See Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 166 (2006) (indicating 
that the Robinson-Patman Act “proscribes only price discrimination [that] threatens to injure 
competition” (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Brooke Grp. Ltd. 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 209–10 (1993) (comparing the “character” of 
claims under the two laws). See generally I ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 504–20 (7th ed. 2012) 
(collecting cases). 
68 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ch. IV.A (2007), 
https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/chapter4.pdf (recommending repeal); 
GIFFORD & KUDRLE, supra note 5, at 63–73; Andrew I. Gavil, Secondary Line Price Discrimination and 
the Fate of Morton Salt: To Save it, Let It Go, 48 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1063 (1999) (advocating for “further 
refine[ment]” of the “injury to a competitor” concept); Earl W. Kintner & Joseph P. Bauer, The Robinson-
Patman Act: A Look Backwards, a View Forward, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 571, 574 (1986) (summarizing 
literature and proposals for reform); John B. Kirkwood, Reforming the Robinson-Patman Act to Serve 
Consumers and Control Powerful Buyers, 60 ANTITRUST BULL. 358, 358 (2015) (discussing the flaws 
in the Robinson-Patman Act and advocating for reform); D. Daniel Sokol, Analyzing Robinson-Patman, 
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will be prohibited.69 Part 102(c) of the Treaty specifically lists one example 
of such an abuse as “applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage.”70  
This provision can apply to price discrimination claims as well as the 
tying, bundling, and excessive pricing claims discussed elsewhere in this 
Article.71 Three conditions must be present for a finding of unlawful price 
discrimination under EU law: (1) the firm imposing the differential pricing 
must have market power, (2) the firm has some ability to sort customers 
based on their willingness to pay, and (3) the firm must be able to prevent or 
limit the resale of the goods or services.72 
In the EU, both primary line discriminatory practices and secondary line 
practices are regulated under Article 102(c).73 Primary line discriminatory 
practices include those that are aimed to hurt other competitors and include 
the offering of rebates, selective price cuts, and tying/bundling.74 Within the 
rebate setting, rebates given based on the quantity ordered were found to be 
discriminatory in Michelin II,75 fidelity rebates given to entice purchasers 
were found to be discriminatory in the Hoffman-La Roche case,76 and target 
rebates set on the retailer meeting a high sales target were also found to be 
discriminatory in Michelin I.77 In Irish Sugar, the Commission held that 
selective price cuts given to certain retailers by manufacturers can amount 
to price discrimination in violation of 102(c).78 
Secondary line price discrimination, whereby favored customers receive 
discounts or other forms of lower prices versus other customers, is also 
regulated under Article 102(c).79 For example, in the Brussels National 
Airport case, the Commission determined that Article 82(c) (the predecessor 
to Article 102(c)) applies to cases where a firm with a dominant position 
gives preference to one “undertaking” pursuing the same policy as another 
                                                                                                                     
69 TFEU art. 102. 
70 Id.  
71 See infra notes 120–75 and accompanying text. 
72 Damien Geradin & Nicolas Petit, Price Discrimination Under EC Competition Law: The Need 
for a Case-by-Case Approach 4 (Glob. Competition Law Ctr., Working Paper 07/05, 2005), 
https://www.coleurope.eu/research-paper/price-discrimination-under-ec-competition-law-need-case-
case-approach.  
73 Id. at 10, 26.  
74 Id. at 11.  
75 Case T-203/01, Michelin v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-4071; Geradin & Petit, supra note 72, at 
12.  
76 Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche & Co. AG v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R. 461; Geradin & Petit, supra 
note 72, at 12.  
77 Case 322/81, Michelin v. Comm’n, 1983 E.C.R. 3461; Geradin & Petit, supra note 72, at 14.  
78 Commission Decision 97/624, Irish Sugar, 1997 O.J. (L 258) 1; Geradin & Petit, supra note 72, 
at 16.  
79 Geradin & Petit, supra note 72, at 26-27.  
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“undertaking.”80 Most recently, the European Court of Judgment stated that 
unlawful secondary line price discrimination does not require proof of “an 
actual, quantifiable deterioration in the competitive position.”81 
Russian antimonopoly law prohibits setting different prices for the same 
good and prohibits imposing discriminatory conditions for the sale of 
goods.82 The Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) of Russia implements a 
rule of reason approach when considering price discrimination cases.83 This 
approach considers the applicable market and the firm’s power in that 
market, considers the motives behind the behavior, and finally weighs the 
positive effects on the policy against the negative effects.84 A Russian 
plaintiff in a price discrimination case must prove: (1) that different prices 
were set for the same product, (2) at the same time, (3) in the same market, 
and (4) there was no procompetitive justification for the setting of such 
prices.85 When looking to discriminatory condition cases, the FAS analyzes 
the dominant position of the firm, the effect of the policy, and any proffered 
justifications.86 
Section 47 of the Singapore Competition Act states that any act 
constituting an abuse of a dominant position will be prohibited.87 The Act 
gives an example of such an abuse as “applying dissimilar conditions to 
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a 
competitive disadvantage.”88 The Competition Commission of Singapore 
notes that such discrimination is only possible where the firm is able to 
differentiate between categories of buyers.89 Further, in order for the practice 
to be condemned, there must be evidence of actual harm to competition.90 
Procompetitive justifications will also be considered when determining if 
price discrimination is an abuse.91 Such justifications can include efficient 
                                                                                                                     
80 Commission Decision 95/364, Brussels National Airport, 1995 O.J. (L 216) 8; Geradin & Petit, 
supra note 72, at 28.  
81 Case C-525/16, MEO — Serviços de Comunicações e Multimédia SA v. Autoridade da 
Concorrência (2018), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text= 
&docid=201264&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=123958.  
82 OECD COMPETITION COMM., RUSSIAN FEDERATION SUMMARY ON PRICE DISCRIMINATION 1 
(Nov. 30, 2016), https://en.fas.gov.ru/upload/other/Price%20Discrimination%20 
(Russian%20Contributions).pdf. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 9.  
85 Id. at 4.  
86 Id. at 5-6.  
87 Competition Act, SINGAPORE STATUTES ONLINE (Jan. 31, 2006), 
https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/CA2004.  
88 Id.  
89 COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N OF SINGAPORE, CCCS GUIDELINES ON THE SECTION 47 
PROHIBITION 54 (2016). 
90 Id. at 55.  
91 Id.  
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cost recovery, expansion of demand/opening up new markets, and various 
other efficiencies.92 
Article 6 of Peru’s Competition Act prohibits “restrictive practices that 
affect free competition.”93 Price discrimination is one example of vertical 
practices that restrict such competition.94 The law in Peru also considers 
price discrimination to be an abuse of dominance.95 In such abuse of 
dominance cases, there must be a showing of dominance and the defendant 
can proffer justifications for their price discrimination.96  
The question again is not the soundness of the application of this area of 
the law. Price discrimination is yet another area that illustrates the 
divergence between widespread use of such provisions around the world but 
not in the United States, which has rejected this area of the law as a 
meaningful part of the antitrust enterprise. 
E. Predatory Pricing 
Predatory pricing is defined as the temporary cutting of price below 
some measure of cost to eliminate or discipline one or more competitors.97 
Predatory pricing is virtually a dead letter in the United States despite being 
alive and well in many other jurisdictions, particularly those following an 
EU style abuse of dominance model. After decades of differing standards in 
the lower courts, the Supreme Court established in 1993 a daunting standard 
for predatory pricing in the Brooke Group case.98 The Court held that to 
establish a claim for unlawful predatory pricing the plaintiff must show both 
that the defendant’s prices fell below some economically relevant measure 
of cost and that the defendant was likely to recoup any losses suffered during 
the period of predation.99 In the aftermath of Brooke Group, there are no 
reported verdicts in favor of either the government or private plaintiffs in 
U.S. predatory pricing cases.100 
                                                                                                                     
92 Id.  
93 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION [OECD], PERU-PEER REVIEW OF COMPETITION LAW AND 
POLICY 25 (2004), http://www.oecd.org/countries/peru/34728182.pdf.  
94 Id.  
95 Id. at 29.  
96 Id.  
97 Predatory pricing can arise under both the monopolization and attempted monopolization prongs 
of section 2 of the Sherman Act as well as section 2A of the Clayton Act’s price discrimination 
provisions.  
98 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
99 Id. at 222, 224; see also Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 
312, 325 (2007) (applying Brooke Group to allegations of predatory buying). 
100 See, e.g., United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1114 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting the 
Supreme Court, which noted “there is a consensus among commentators that predatory pricing schemes 
are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful”). 
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In contrast, the seminal case establishing the test for predatory pricing 
in the EU is Akzo Chemie BV v. Commission.101 Akzo establishes that prices 
set below average variable cost (AVC) will be deemed a per se violation.102 
However, where a firm sets prices above AVC but below average total cost 
(ATC), a violation will only be found where it is established that the price 
was set as a plan to eliminate a competitor.103 Later, in France Télécom v. 
Commission and Tetra Pak, the Commission established that recoupment is 
not an element of predatory pricing cases in the European Union.104 Most 
recently in Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet, the European Court of 
Justice upheld the standard from Akzo and emphasized that where a firm sets 
price above AVC, but below ATC, a violation can be found if an intent to 
harm a competitor is found.105 
Article 17 of China’s Antimonopoly Law prohibiting the abuse of a 
dominant position provides an example of abuse as selling products at prices 
below cost without a legitimate reason.106 The Article, however, gives no 
indication of what cost will be used to measure “below cost.”107 The National 
Development and Reform Commission drafted regulations to define below 
cost as charging a price that would cause the firm to incur a loss with the 
intent to exclude competitors.108 This regulation has not yet been adopted. 
In order to prove a case, the plaintiff in a PRC predatory pricing case 
must show that the firm charging the low price has market power or is in a 
dominant position.109 Similar to EU predatory pricing law, recoupment does 
not need to be shown for a predatory pricing violation.110 The law also 
indicates that a defendant in a predatory pricing case will be able to present 
procompetitive justifications as a defense for their pricing policy.111 
Section 8(c) of the South African Competition Act states that it is 
prohibited for a dominant firm to engage in an exclusionary act.112 Section 
8(d)(iv) then states that such an exclusionary act includes selling goods 
                                                                                                                     
101 Case C-62/86, Akzo Chemie BV v. Comm’n, 1991 E.C.R. I-3439, I-3455.  
102 Id. at I-3455.  
103 Id.  
104 Case T-340/03, France Télécom v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-181; Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak Int’l 
v. Comm’n, 1994 E.C.R. II-827. 
105 Case C-209/10, Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerådet, Judgment, 2012 E.C.R. 172, ¶ 27; 
Howard Rosenblatt et al., Post Danmark: Predatory Pricing in the European Union, EUR. ANTITRUST 
REV., 2013, at 21.  
106 Adrian Emch & Gregory K. Leonard, Predatory Pricing in China: In Line with International 
Practice?, LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 305, 306 (2010), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1713782. 
107 Id. 
108 Id.  
109 Id. at 308.  
110 Id. at 312.  
111 Id. at 314.  
112 Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 8 (S. Afr.).  
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below their “marginal or average variable cost.”113 There have been a small 
number of notable predatory pricing cases brought in South Africa, the first 
being the case brought by Nationwide Airlines against South African 
Airways.114 The Nationwide case established that pricing below average 
variable cost raises a presumption of anticompetitive effect.115 In a second 
airline case, this time brought by the South African Competition 
Commission, the tribunal held that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving 
anticompetitive effects of the pricing policy implemented by the 
defendant.116 
In the most recent case brought by the Commission against Media 24, 
the Competition Tribunal dismissed a predatory pricing case under 8(d)(iv) 
because the plaintiff did not establish that the price was set below average 
avoidable cost, the measure of the cost that the firm could have avoided by 
not engaging in predatory behavior.117 The tribunal however did find a 
violation under 8(c) because the plaintiff did show pricing below average 
total cost, predatory intent, and recoupment on behalf of the defendant.118 
Predatory pricing claims outside the United States require a high burden 
of proof in most jurisdictions.119 However, in not requiring recoupment, they 
remain part of the canon of competition law in most jurisdictions outside the 
United States. 
F. Margin Squeezes 
Closely related is the international divergence on the question of price 
squeeze or margin squeeze claims. A price squeeze arises when a vertically 
integrated dominant firm also acts as a supplier to competitors in some 
upstream market.120 The notion of a price squeeze is that the dominant firm 
sets input prices so high that no competitor can then successfully enter or 
compete with the dominant firm in the downstream market.  
In the past, the United States appeared to accept such claims in the 
aluminum industry. Alcoa, the monopoly supplier of virgin aluminum ingot, 
                                                                                                                     
113 Id.  
114 NEIL MACKENZIE, BELL DEWAR, ARE SOUTH AFRICA’S PREDATORY PRICING RULES 
SUITABLE? 11  (last visited Mar. 6, 2018); Nationwide Airlines v. S. African Airways 2001 1 (Tribunal) 
(S. Afr.). 
115Nationwide Airlines v. S. African Airways 2001 1 at 10; MACKENZIE, supra note 114, at 11.  
116 MACKENZIE, supra note 114, at 11–12; see also Comm’n v. S. African Airways 2005 1 (Tribunal) 
at 35 para. 132–35 (S. Afr.) (“In terms of 8(c) we then consider whether the anti-competitive effect 
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117 Comm’n v. Media 24 Ltd. 2015 1 (Tribunal) at 53, para. 211–12 (S. Afr.). 
118 Id. at 150 para. 621.  
119 See supra Part I.C (discussing what kinds of practices rise to the level of predatory pricing in 
various jurisdictions outside of the United States). 
120 J. Gregory Sidak, Abolishing the Price Squeeze as a Theory of Antitrust Liability, 4 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 279, 279 (2008). 
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set prices of outside fabricators of finished aluminum products, such as pots 
and pans, so high that such downstream competitors could not effectively 
compete with the finished products made by Alcoa itself.121  
In 2008, the United States Supreme Court reached precisely the opposite 
conclusion in Linkline Communications.122 Linkline concerned allegations 
that an incumbent telephone company had overcharged competing internet 
access providers for access to its telephone lines.123 Relying on Trinko, the 
Court held that since the defendant had no antitrust duty to provide access, 
it could not incur liability for providing access at allegedly too high a 
price.124 The Court further held that the only potential cause of action for the 
plaintiff would be if the dominant firm engaged in predatory pricing of its 
broadband services in the downstream market, including both proof of price 
below some economically relevant measure of cost and the likelihood of 
recoupment as set forth in Brooke Group.125 
Since the EU diverges significantly from the results of both Trinko and 
Brook Group, it is not surprising it also follows a different path as to price 
squeeze cases, which by their nature incorporate aspects of both access and 
pricing claims. For example, the European Court of Justice upheld liability 
in the 2010 Deutsche Telekom (DT) margin squeeze decision.126 The court 
affirmed liability where the dominant telephone firm charged excessive 
prices for access to telephone lines necessary to compete with DT for selling 
broadband service to consumers.127 The ECJ reached a similar result in the 
2014 Telefonica decision involving the dominant Spanish telephone 
provider’s pricing of phone lines to its broadband competitors.128 
The UK has considered a number of margin squeeze cases and most 
prominently found liability in the Genzyme decision.129 Genzyme controlled 
a drug necessary for the care of a rare, but devastating, illness called Gaucher 
                                                                                                                     
121 United States v. Alumininum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 436–38 (2d Cir. 1945). See generally 
SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THE STORY OF ALCOA: THE ENDURING QUESTIONS OF MARKET POWER, 
CONDUCT, AND REMEDY IN MONOPOLIZATION CASES, ANTITRUST STORIES 121–22 (Eleanor M. Fox & 
Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007) (introducing United States v. Aluminum Co. of America and emphasizing its 
significance in American antitrust law). 
122 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 450–51 (2009). 
123 Id. at 438. 
124 Id. at 450–51; Id. at 439–40.  
125 Id. at 451. 
126 Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. I-9614–15, I-9717. 
127 Id. ¶ 183; see also Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sveirge AB, 2011 E.C.R. I-
566, I-575–76, I-599.  
128 Case C-295/12 P, Telefónica SA & Telefónica de España v. Comm’n, 2014 E.C.R. 2062, ¶¶ 9, 
24, 237; Case T-851/14, Slovak Telekom v. Comm’n, 2018 ¶¶ 110–12, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=209008&pageIndex=0&doclang=en
&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=10279707; Case E-6/17, Fjarskipti hf. v. Siminn hf., 2018 ¶ 
73, https://eftacourt.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/6_17__Judgment_EN.pdf.  
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disease.130 The defendant provided both the drug and the care system for 
those taking the medication.131 It later began supplying the drug to an outside 
health provider, but at the same price it charged for the drug and the care 
system including nursing staff.132 The Office of Fair Trading, the former UK 
competition agency, found this behavior to be unlawful, stating: 
A pricing policy operated by a vertically integrated dominant 
undertaking may infringe . . . the Act. This might occur where 
a vertically integrated undertaking which is dominant in the 
upstream market operates a pricing policy which does not 
allow reasonably efficient competitors in the downstream 
market a margin sufficient to enable them to survive in the 
long term.133 
A 2009 OECD roundtable on margin squeezes states: 
Margin squeeze cases are relatively common. Many 
competition authorities have examined at least a few 
complaints involving a potentially illegal margin squeeze. 
Many of these cases arise in newly liberalised sectors – 
particular [sic] telecommunications, but also in the water 
sector, railways, postal services, pharmaceuticals, pay 
television, gasoline, and funeral services (amongst others).134 
The executive summary of the OECD roundtable also notes that almost 
all margin squeeze cases arise under the general prohibition of abuse of 
dominance provisions in national competition laws.135 It also specifically 
mentions a German statutory provision addressing margin squeeze cases in 
relation to small and medium-sized companies.136 
There are a number of critiques of price squeeze claims on theoretical 
and empirical grounds.137 It nonetheless remains the case that the position of 
                                                                                                                     
130 Id. ¶ 5. 
131 Id. ¶¶ 5–8. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. ¶ 364; see also Office of Gas & Elec. Mkts. [OFGEM], Decision to Accept Binding 
Commitments from Elec. N. W. Ltd. Over Connection Charges, at 31, 35 (May 24, 2012), 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/system/files/docs/2017/04/final-draft-17-may.pdf (accepting commitments 
from regulated electrical utility to cease margin squeeze allegation regarding access to its electrical grid). 
134 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], POLICY ROUNDTABLES: MARGIN 
SQUEEZE 8 (2009), http://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/46048803.pdf (surveying practices in twenty-
five jurisdictions).  
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 See, e.g., Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, The Viability of Antitrust Price-Squeeze 
Claims, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 273, 297 (2009) (criticizing price squeeze claims on the grounds that they could 
actually encourage price fixing and that allowing courts to predict the “correct price” in these situations 
places the court in a position of a public utility regulator, and finding few circumstances in which liability 
for price-squeezing is appropriate); Sidak, supra note 120, at 281 (questioning “whether price-squeeze 
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the United States on such issues as excessive pricing, predatory pricing, and 
access to infrastructure have led it to abandon enforcement in price and 
margin squeeze cases. In contrast, much of the rest of the international 
competition community brings such claims when the facts so indicate. 
G. Tying and Bundling 
Tying is the practice where a seller uses its market power over one good 
or service to coerce a buyer into taking a second good or service it may not 
want or may wish to purchase from a different seller.138 Examples include 
requiring buyers to purchase machine tools and the ingredients for the 
products made with the machines; contracts requiring use of a designated 
anesthesia group in all hospital operating rooms; and forcing buyers to 
purchase both spare parts and service from the manufacturer of the copying 
equipment, rather than from an independent service provider. 
In Jefferson Parish, the United States Supreme Court set forth a quasi 
per se rule for tying under the Sherman and Clayton acts.139 This per se 
standard for tying requires proof of four elements: (1) that the tying and tied 
items entail separate products or services in the sense that there is separate 
demand for each of them without the other; (2) that the availability of the 
tying item has been conditioned upon purchase, rental, or license of the tied 
item; (3) that the party imposing the tie has sufficient market power for the 
tying item to “appreciably restrain free competition” in the tied market; and 
(4) that a “not insubstantial amount of commerce” in the tied item is affected 
by the tying arrangement.140  
Jefferson Parrish was unanimous in its result that the plaintiff failed to 
prove the third element of the per se standard for tying—showing the 
defendant had market power over the tying product.141  The decision also 
included a concurrence by Justice O’Connor, joined by two other Justices. 
The O’Connor concurrence argued for the adoption of the full rule of reason 
test for all tying claims and also argued that complementary products should 
                                                                                                                     
concept aids or hinders coherent analysis under section 2 of the Sherman Act”); see also Bradley Aburn, 
Margin Squeezing: The Superfluous “Fancy Phrase” of New Zealand Competition Law, 18 AUCKLAND 
U. L. REV. 216, 230 (2012) (noting that price squeezing could benefit consumers, as it “does not give a 
dominant firm more power than it already has”); Germain Gaudin & Despoina Mantzari, Margin 
Squeeze: An Above-Cost Predatory Pricing Approach, 12 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 151, 155 (2016) 
(criticizing the EU approach to price-squeeze liability as over-deterring, and finding that “because of the 
so-called ‘umbrella effect,’ a dominant firm would face a de facto price floor at the retail level once the 
wholesale price is set, if squeeze is too broadly defined and punished by law”).  
138 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 451 (1992). 
139 Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 2–3 (1984). 
140 Id. at 2, 3, 15–18, 34. 
141 Id. at 2, 31–32.  
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not be viewed as a tie of separate products even if there was some demand 
for different sources of the complementary good or services.142 
The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed this quasi per se test in its 
subsequent decision in Eastman Kodak.143 The Court also took no steps to 
abandon the quasi per se rule in the more recent Independent Ink decision 
dealing with the market power requirement of tying law.144 
The D.C. Circuit, in its 2001 Microsoft decision, believed that a full rule 
of reason test should apply to claims of technological tying and sought to 
distinguish this result from the more general quasi per se rule set forth by 
the United States Supreme Court in Jefferson Parish.145 Additional lower 
courts have from time to time applied a rule of reason analysis on alternative 
rationales, rather than applying the current prevailing quasi per se test from 
Jefferson Parish.146 
The EU approaches these issues very differently. Article 101 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that all 
agreements that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or 
distortion of competition are prohibited.147 Article 101(d) defines such an 
agreement as any agreement that: “make[s] the conclusion of contracts 
subject to acceptance by the parties of supplementary obligations which . . .  
have no connection with the subject of such contract[].”148  
Article 102(d) also states that an unlawful abuse of dominance can 
include “making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the 
parties of supplementary obligations which . . . have no connection with the 
subject of such contract.”149 As a result, tying agreements can be both an 
abuse of dominance and an illegal agreement under EU law. 
In Tetra Pak, the ECJ Court illustrated how tying can be regulated under 
Article 102 and that tying arrangements constitute an abuse of a dominant 
position if the abuse is not objectively justified.150 The ECJ affirmed liability 
for the tying of the sale of machinery for packaging of liquid and semi-liquid 
food products to the sale of the cartons themselves. The court noted that 
tying by a dominant firm would be unlawfully abusive without objective 
justification, even if in accordance with commercial usage or if there was a 
natural link between the two items.151  
                                                                                                                     
142 Id. at 33–34. 
143 Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 451–53. 
144 Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42 (2006). 
145 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
146 See In re Cox Enters., Inc., 871 F.3d 1093, 1104 (10th Cir. 2017) (applying a mixture of the per 
se test and Jefferson Parish factors). 
147 TFEU art. 101. 
148 Id. art. 101(d). 
149 Id. art. 102(d). 
150 Case C-333/94P, Tetra Pak Int’l SA v. Comm’n, 1996 E.C.R. I-5951. 
151 Id. at I-6010–11.  
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The EU Microsoft case also illustrates how the tying offense in the EU 
is broader than the U.S. approach.152 Microsoft states that in the EU, 
distinctness of products can be established by looking to consumer 
demand.153 Distinctness can be shown through direct consumer evidence or 
indirect evidence such as the presence of other firms in the market that sell 
the tied product without the tying product.154 But it is important to note that 
the EU Commission imposed liability, affirmed by the General Court, for 
the tying of the Windows Media Player to the operating system.155 This 
result is in marked distinction to the tying claims regarding internet browsers 
and operating systems reversed and remanded by the D.C. Circuit and 
ultimately abandoned by the Justice Department in the U.S. Microsoft 
litigation.156  
Microsoft also was found liable for the tying of various software 
applications with its dominant network server operating system. While EU 
defendants can still prevail if they offer a sufficient objective justification 
including efficiencies, such justifications rarely prevail and were rejected in 
the EU Microsoft decision.157 This divergence with the evolving U.S. 
approach to tying is highlighted in the criticism by U.S. politicians, 
enforcement officials, and commentators.158 
In the merger context, the European Commission has also expressed fear 
over future tying and bundling by dominant firms with a wide range of 
products to the detriment of competitors with less extensive products lines 
as one of the grounds for barring the General Electric/Honeywell merger in 
the aviation industry.159 The United States subsequently organized a 
roundtable at the OECD where it was highly critical of this and other aspects 
                                                                                                                     
152 Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, I-3613–14, 5 C.M.L.R. 11 
(2007) [hereinafter Microsoft EU]. 
153 Id. at II-3613, ¶ 16. 
154 Id. at I-3613. 
155 Id. at II-3601. 
156 United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 89 (2001). 
157 Microsoft EU, supra note 152, ¶¶ 690, 707. 
158 GIFFORD & KUDRLE, supra note 5, at 182–84; WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE 
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Kantor et al., EU Imposes Sanctions on Microsoft, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 25, 2004), 
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159 Commission Decision 2004/134/EC of 3 July 2001, declaring a concentration to be incompatible 
with the common market and the EEA Agreement Case COMP / M.2220 – General Electric/Honeywell, 
2006 O.J. (L 48) 1 (EC); Case T-210/01, Gen. Elec. Co. v. Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-5575. 
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of the EU’s approach in GE/Honeywell.160 Tying and bundling concerns 
remain a staple of EU conglomerate merger analysis and have led to the 
imposition of behavioral remedies in several recent transactions that were 
cleared unconditionally by the United States.161 
A 2009 ICN survey on tying practices around the world indicates a high 
degree of diversity as to the requirements of tying offenses with many 
jurisdictions within the EU and elsewhere actively enforcing such 
provisions.162 For example, the German Bundeskartellampt indicated that it 
is not necessary for tying conduct to cause direct consumer harm. It is 
sufficient that “the conduct is detrimental to competition and to an effective 
market structure and thus harms consumers indirectly.”163 
Article 17 of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law states that an abuse of a 
dominant position can occur where a firm, without justifiable reasons, 
imposes tying.164 In the PRC Tetra Pak case, the defendant was accused of 
tying packing materials with its sale of paper packing equipment.165 The 
State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) found that Tetra 
Pak’s practices were harmful as they limited customer choice, affected sales 
of competitors, and restricted competition.166  
Tetra Pak offered justifications for its tying practice that were rejected 
by the SAIC. It claimed that tying was necessary to ensure performance and 
that tying also protected consumer health and safety. The SAIC found that 
there were other high-quality packing materials that sufficiently ensured 
performance of Tetra Pak’s equipment, and that Tetra Pak failed to show 
that other packing materials inadequately protected consumer health and 
safety.167  
In Qihoo v. Tencent, the first anti-monopoly case heard by the Chinese 
Supreme Court, the court laid out five criteria to be considered in a tying 
case.168 These include: (1) a tied product distinct from the tying product; (2) 
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a defendant with a dominant position in the tying market; (3) consumers 
required to accept the tied product along with the tying; (4) that there is no 
justifiable reason for the tie; and (5) a negative impact on competition.169 
The court ultimately did not find illegal tying as there was a lack of 
restriction on consumers shown, and because there was no evidence of a 
dominant position in the tying market.170 Tying allegations involving 
essential and non-essential patents were also an important part of the 
Qualcomm and other intellectual property antitrust cases in the PRC.171 
Chapter II, section 3(4) of the Indian Competition Act of 2002 provides 
that any tie-in arrangement shall be prohibited if the agreement has “an 
appreciable adverse effect on competition in India.”172 A rule of reason 
analysis applies to tying arrangements in India. This involves looking to the 
adverse effects on competition as well as any benefits shown from the tying 
arrangement. Chapter IV, section 19 of the Competition Act provides what 
should be looked at in a section 3 analysis when determining if there are 
appreciable adverse effects on competition: (1) creation of barriers to new 
entrants; (2) driving existing competitors out of the market; (3) foreclosure 
of competition by hindering entry; (4) accrual of benefits to consumers; (5) 
improvements in production or distribution of goods and services; and (6) 
promotion of technical, scientific, and economic development.173  
Illegal tying also was found in Consumer Online Foundation v. Tata Sky 
Ltd. where television service was denied to customers unless customers also 
purchased hardware from the provider.174 The Commission found that this 
was an unlawful tying arrangement under Section 3(4) of the Competition 
Act, and that it was likely to have an adverse effect on the market given that 
the service providers controlled eighty percent of the service market.175 
Tying and bundling claims illustrate the same dynamic as most types of 
abuse of a dominant position. The United States has been shrinking or 
eliminating the scope of such claims, which remain more available to public 
and private enforcers in other jurisdictions.  
H. Single Product Rebates 
Single product discounts or rebates refer to a situation where a firm 
grants substantial discounts (sometimes on an ever-increasing basis) where 
the buyer achieves certain targets based on either aggregate purchases or 
percentages of purchases of that category of products or services. Such 
arrangements raise competition concerns when the discount effectively 
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forecloses an equally efficient competitor from being able to compete in the 
market for the sales to customers receiving the rebates or survive on the 
remaining sales opportunities in the market. 
One example would be a market when there are several substantial 
purchasers buying one million widgets each per year and a small number of 
fringe purchasers buying a few thousand widgets annually. The largest 
widget supplier—but not necessarily the more efficient—creates a rebate 
program that provides a small rebate for all sales up to 999,999 units, and a 
whopping twelve percent rebate for the millionth sale and all prior sales for 
the year.  
Single product discounts or rebates are rarely unlawful under U.S. 
antitrust law. In fact, they are often praised as a form of price competition 
representing the essence of the type of competition on the merits to be 
encouraged through antitrust law.176 Such discounts normally will be 
analyzed under the exacting standards for predatory pricing discussed 
above,177 and only found illegal where price after rebate is below some 
economically relevant measure of the discounter’s costs and there is a 
likelihood that the discounting firm eventually can recoup its losses.178 Other 
times, such discounts will be analyzed under a more complex version of the 
predatory pricing analysis that involves attributing the full discounts to the 
portion of sales where the competing firms must match the discounts and 
then determining whether price is below cost and whether recoupment is 
likely.179 Even if the single product rebates or discounts result in a de facto 
exclusive dealing arrangement, it will, at most, be subject to the general rule 
of reason analysis for such contracts.180 Regardless of the standard used, 
most claims have been singularly unsuccessful in recent years with courts 
reluctant to impose liability for conduct viewed as closely resembling 
healthy price competition.181 
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The EU courts have been significantly more concerned with fidelity 
rebates and found numerous examples to be abuses of a dominant position. 
Certain portions of the cases further discuss such rebates in terms of 
unlawful price discrimination which can also be a violation of Article 102.182 
The ECJ also has used reasoning that analogizes such rebates to de facto 
tying and exclusive dealing.183 Professor Ariel Ezrachi summarizes the EU 
approach as follows: 
Fidelity rebates are objectionable when they stimulate 
customers to tie themselves to the dominant undertaking and 
create de facto exclusivity. Such rebates weaken the structure 
of competition in the market, strengthen the market power of 
the already dominant undertaking and act as a barrier to entry. 
It is therefore irrelevant that the tied undertaking willingly 
entered into the agreement and is benefitting in the short term 
from the rebates.184  
Michelin is the classic case in this regard. Michelin was the dominant 
firm for replacement tires for buses and trucks.185 The ECJ condemned 
Michelin’s highly opaque and unwritten year-end rebate program where 
each customer was provided rebates once it achieved total year sales figures 
set in excess of the prior year.186 In a later case, the General Court similarly 
rejected a revised rebate plan based on Michelin’s failure to demonstrate that 
the plan was objectively economically justified or that it was truly a 
quantity-based discount rather than a loyalty-inducing discount.187 In several 
cases, the ECJ also found that there was no need to show actual harmful 
effects on competition to invalidate such rebates, or at most that the rebates 
were capable of producing such effects.188  
The European Commission subsequently published guidance on the 
application of Article 102 in a more economically oriented manner and 
focused on proof of actual effects for fidelity rebates.189 Despite this 
development, two commentators still note: 
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Although both jurisdictions now employ some version of 
predatory pricing analysis in their consideration of single-
product discounts, this superficial similarity rests on a 
structure of considerable difference. US courts have generally 
found loyalty discounts to be procompetitive . . . . In contrast, 
EU courts appear willing to ignore the complex models of the 
Commission and declare such discounting by dominant firms 
as abusive without considering competitive effects. In 
addition, the Commission’s approach accepts a more inclusive 
cost standard for computing predatory pricing and gives less 
attention to recoupment or lasting market impact than would 
be expected in the United States. Some observers have seen 
the FTC Intel case as an innovation because it appeared . . . to 
move the United States in the direction the Commission 
favors, but the pricing conduct agreed in the settlement is 
difficult to interpret, and no adjudication was involved.190 
The Commission Guidance and the more recent ECJ decision in Intel191 
may have nudged the EU slightly back in the direction of the United States 
on this issue. However, that decision is equally opaque and final resolution 
is years in the future,192 leaving a persistent and substantial divergence in 
both substance and outcome on the treatment of single product rebates.  
Outside the United States and the EU, single product rebates tend not to 
be analyzed through a predatory pricing lens. A 2016 OECD Roundtable on 
fidelity rebates concluded: 
Tests for below-cost pricing, including the ‘discount 
attribution test’, are not a reliable way to identify the 
anticompetitive effects of a fidelity rebate scheme. A 
predatory pricing framework can identify cases in which firms 
use a fidelity rebate scheme to put in place a strategy of 
predatory foreclosure against an as-efficient competitor. 
However, it fails to identify cases in which consumers are 
harmed as a result of a firm excluding rivals without pricing 
below cost. While a price-cost test might be a useful analytical 
tool in some cases, it would be ineffective as a screening 
                                                                                                                     
190 GIFFORD & KUDRLE, supra note 5, at 138. 
191 Case C-413/14 P, Intel Corp. Inc. v. Comm’n, 2017 ECLI:EU:C:2017:632, ¶¶ 1, 150. 
192 See Kevin Coates, The Court of Justice and Intel: An Overdue Ruling that was Still Over-Hasty?, 
32 ANTITRUST 57, 57 (2018) (“But the Court of Justice’s September 2017 ruling did not reach a final 
conclusion on the Commission’s analysis of Intel’s rebate system. . . . As a result, it now looks possible 
that the case will celebrate its 20th anniversary in 2020 without a final resolution.”). 
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device or safe-harbour in an assessment or prioritisation 
guide.193 
Reasonable people may differ on the best approach to single product 
rebates. But few would contest the global divide in this area of dominant 
firm conduct. 
I. Bundled Discounts 
Bundled discounts involve situations where sellers offer substantial 
discounts based on the buyers achieving a certain purchase target across a 
spectrum of products or categories. A simple example cited in a leading U.S. 
case involves a seller of both shampoo and conditioner providing substantial 
discounts or rebates for a buyer purchasing a set quantity or percentage of 
their needs for both products and the competitive effect this could have on 
an equally efficient manufacturer of only one of these items.194 
Unlike single product discounts, there are a number of U.S. antitrust 
cases dealing with this phenomenon and relatively few decisions in the EU. 
While the U.S. case law has yet to settle on a single consistent approach, the 
courts (with one prominent exception) have been equally as suspicious of 
such claims as in the single product rebate context. While there have been 
fewer cases outside the United States, the EU and other jurisdictions have 
addressed such claims more favorably both in abuse of dominance cases and 
merger investigations. 
There has not yet been a U.S. Supreme Court ruling on the standards of 
legality for bundled discounts. The courts of appeals have utilized diverse 
approaches proceeding by analogy to theories of tying, exclusive dealing, 
and predatory pricing.  
The principal appellate case imposing liability for bundled discounts 
across product lines is LePage’s Inc. v. 3M.195 In LePage’s, the Third Circuit 
affirmed liability for monopolization of the market for transparent tape.196 
The plaintiff was a successful manufacturer of private label tape sold in large 
office supply stores and other retailers.197 3M responded to this threat by 
offering cash payments, signing bonuses, and other types of discounts if 
                                                                                                                     
193 DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS, COMPETITION COMM., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION AND DEV., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ROUNDTABLE ON FIDELITY REBATES AT THE 
125TH MEETING OF THE COMPETITION COMMITTEE OF THE OECD 3 (2016), 
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/M(2016)1/ANN4/FINAL/en/pdf.  
194 Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
195 LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 144 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. 
v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof’l Publ’ns, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1543 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating 
bundled discounts of different types of Bar Exam preparation courses and materials could be unlawful 
even where the bundled price exceeded the combined cost of production). 
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customers achieved certain sales targets across multiple 3M products lines 
for tape, office supplies, health care, and other products.198 LePage’s, as a 
manufacturer of tape only, could not match these bundled discounts 
regardless of whether or not the discounts fell below some relevant 
measurement of 3M’s costs.199  
Most of the rest of the case law on bundled prices have used different 
versions of predatory pricing analyses. One federal appellate court applying 
the state antitrust laws of Colorado stated, “when sales of more than one item 
are bundled, whether in a single transaction or in the form of coupons or 
other concessions, compliance with the statute is determined by comparing 
the selling price to the cost of all items ‘included in such transaction[].’”200  
A leading Ninth Circuit case took a different approach also based on 
viewing the bundled discounts as a form of predatory pricing. In Cascade 
Health, the court explicitly rejected the LePage’s approach in connection 
with allegations that a dominant hospital bundled acute care services with 
other more specialized forms of care if insurance companies selected 
Cascade Health as their exclusive provider for their insurance networks.201 
In so doing, the Ninth Circuit overturned a jury verdict in favor of a smaller 
hospital that only provided acute care services. 
The court held: 
To prove that a bundled discount was exclusionary or 
predatory for the purposes of a monopolization or attempted 
monopolization claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act, the 
plaintiff must establish that, after allocating the discount given 
by the defendant on the entire bundle of products to the 
competitive product or products, the defendant sold the 
competitive product or products below its average variable 
cost of producing them.202 
The 2000 report of the Antitrust Modernization Commission was even 
more negative about prospects for bundled discount claims that did not meet 
the full requirements of predatory pricing claims under Brooke Group. That 
report noted: 
                                                                                                                     
198 Id. at 145. 
199 See also SmithKLINE Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1065 (3d Cir. 1978) (concluding 
proof of bundled prices being below cost is not required). But cf. ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 
F.3d 254, 274 n.11 (3d Cir. 2012) (limiting the approach in LePage’s to multi-product rebates and 
affirming use of predatory pricing methodology for single product discount and rebate cases); FTC v. 
Church & Dwight Co., 665 F.3d 1312, 1316–18 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (enforcing FTC subpoena in bundled 
discount case but noting that LePage’s has been “roundly criticized” and that “this court might someday 
reach a different resolution”).  
200 Parish Oil Co. v. Dillon Cos., 523 F.3d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original). 
201 Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 891, 893, 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2008). 
202 Id. at 910. 
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Courts should adopt a three-part test to determine whether 
bundled discounts or rebates violate Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act. To prove a violation of Section 2, a plaintiff should be 
required to show each one of the following elements (as well 
as other elements of a Section 2 claim): (1) after allocating all 
discounts and rebates attributable to the entire bundle of 
products to the competitive product, the defendant sold the 
competitive product below its incremental cost for the 
competitive product; (2) the defendant is likely to recoup these 
short-term losses and (3) the bundled discount or rebate 
program has had or is likely to have an adverse effect on 
competition.203 
In contrast, there is very little EU case law on bundled discounts. The 
European Commission has weighed in on the issue in its Guidance on the 
Application of Article 82 (now Article 102). Here, the Commission took a 
relatively conservative position partially in line with the non-LePage’s line 
of cases in the United States.204  
In the absence of significant case law, it is difficult to say whether the 
European Court of Justice will follow this approach or revert to its more 
expansive treatment in line with its jurisprudence on single product 
discounts. Many of these cases involve multiple types of the same product, 
such as rebate schemes involving different types of tires which disadvantage 
producers of more limited product types.205 There are hints of this in the most 
recent ECJ Intel decision, but that case, as previously noted, was remanded 
for further proceedings and is years from final resolution.206 In addition, the 
European Commission and the ECJ has expressed concerns over range 
effects and bundled discounts across different product lines as part of its 
reasoning in prohibiting the GE-Honeywell conglomerate merger,207 a 
decision which produced fierce criticism in the United States.208 
                                                                                                                     
203 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12 (2007), 
https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf.  
204 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement 
Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant 
Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45) ¶ 60, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009XC0224(01)&from=EN. 
205 See supra notes 191–94 and accompanying text.  
206 Case C-413/14, Intel Corp. Inc. v. Comm’n, 2017 ECLI:EU:C:2017:632, ¶¶ 150. 
207 Commission Decision 2004/134/EC of July 3, 2001, Declaring a Concentration to Be 
Incompatible with the Common Market and the EEA Agreement Case COMP / M.2220 – General 
Electric/Honeywell, 2006 O.J. (L 48) 1 (EC).  
208 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Statement by Assistant Attorney General Charles A. James 
on the EU’s Decision Regarding the GE/Honeywell Acquisition (July 3, 2001) (on file with author) 
(noting that “[c]lear and longstanding U.S. antitrust policy holds that the antitrust laws protect 
competition, not competitors” and that this EU decision represented a significant point of divergence 
between EU and U.S. competition law); see also Charles A. James, International Antitrust in the Bush 
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A 2009 survey of the ICN shows a strong diversity of practice of 
jurisdictions with respect to bundled discounts.209 The goals for enforcement 
in this area typically include but go beyond the promotion of consumer 
welfare cited by the United States. A number of jurisdictions do not require 
price-cost comparisons, do not require recoupment, and/or do not require 
proof of intent.210 France has been particularly active in this area with eight 
challenges to bundled discounts in the ten years preceding the report.211 
J. Essential Facilities Doctrine and Refusals to Deal 
One of the most striking illustrations of the retreat of the United States 
from a traditional theory of monopolization comes in the area of the essential 
facilities doctrine and other forms of unilateral refusals to deal. From the 
earliest days of U.S. antitrust law, the courts have imposed liability under 
both section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Act on a firm or firms 
controlling an essential facility, often in the form of infrastructure such as 
bridges, electrical networks, joint newsgathering operations, and 
occasionally intellectual property, where the owner/operator refused access 
to a competitor and the other elements of an antitrust violation were 
present.212 
Although the United States Supreme Court has never specifically 
endorsed liability under this rubric, the lower courts have often used the 
“essential facilities doctrine” to impose liability for monopolization upon 
proof of: 
1) Control by a monopolist of an essential facility or 
resource serving the monopolist’s market; 
                                                                                                                     
Administration, DEP’T JUST. (Sept. 21, 2001), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/international-antitrust-
bush-administration (criticizing the so-called “portfolio effects” analysis employed by the EU as 
“antithetical to the goals of antitrust law enforcement”); William J. Kolasky, Conglomerate Mergers and 
Range Effects: It’s a Long Way from Chicago to Brussels, DEP’T JUST. (Nov. 9, 2001), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/conglomerate-mergers-and-range-effects-its-long-way-chicago-
brussels (stating the GE/Honeywell merger “triggered a firestorm of criticism, not just from the U.S. 
antitrust agencies and senior administration officials, but also from the business community”). 
209 INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, REPORT ON TYING AND BUNDLED DISCOUNTING 3–4 (2009), 
https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/UCWG_SR_Tying 
BundDisc.pdf (providing an analysis of thirty-five jurisdictions with “respect to tying and bundled 
discounts”).  
210 Id. at 15–17, 19. 
211 Id. at 7. 
212 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 379–80 (1973); Associated Press v. United 
States, 326 U.S. 1, 4 (1945); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n of Saint Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 390–
91, 411–12 (1912); Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1513, 1522, 
1525 (10th Cir. 1984), aff’d on other grounds, 472 U.S. 585, 611 (1985). In addition, the government’s 
landmark monopolization case resulting in the breakup of the monopoly Bell System telephone network 
was based in part on the essential facilities doctrine. See Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, 
Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 5–7 (2008) (explaining the history of Supreme 
Court cases in the essential facilities area). 
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2) A competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to 
duplicate the essential facility; 
3) The unjustified denial of the use of the facility to a 
competitor; and 
4) The feasibility of providing access to the facility.213  
Liability on this theory was always difficult to establish factually, and 
numerous cases failed because either the defendant lacked market power, 
the facility controlled by the monopolist was not “essential” in any normal 
sense of the term, or the excluded competitor could reasonably create or 
duplicate the facility in question.214 In addition, liability was sometimes 
imposed on a general refusal to deal or general monopolization theory, 
blurring the lines of the acceptability of the essential facilities doctrine as a 
separate theory of liability.215 
The Supreme Court in the Trinko decision limited the essential facilities 
doctrine in the context of regulated industries and provided dicta questioning 
its overall viability.216 As commentators described the decision: “The case 
primarily concerned the issue of whether it was an act of monopolization for 
a regulated telephone company to fail to comply with special network 
sharing obligations imposed on it by the Federal Telecommunications 
Act.”217 
The Court held that the alleged violations of regulatory duties by 
themselves did not further provide a cause of action under section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.218 The Court found no additional support for the complaint in 
the plaintiff’s alternative theory based on the essential facilities theory.  
The Court first stated that it had never recognized such a doctrine and 
found no need in Trinko itself to either recognize or repudiate it.219 But 
assuming the doctrine applied, the Court stated in dicta that the claim would 
fail on the question of denied access. The Court stated: 
It suffices for present purposes to note that the indispensable 
requirement for invoking the doctrine is the unavailability of 
access to the “essential facilities”; where access exists, the 
doctrine serves no purpose. Thus, it is said that “essential 
facility claims should . . . be denied where a state or federal 
                                                                                                                     
213 MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 (7th Cir. 1983). 
214 WILLIAM C. HOLMES & MELISSA H. MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 3.12 
(2017–18 ed.) (collecting cases). 
215 Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1984), aff’d on other grounds, 472 U.S. 
585 (1985). 
216 Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
217 HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 214, at 575. 
218 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407–10. 
219 Id. at 411. 
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agency has effective power to compel sharing and to regulate 
its scope and terms.”220 
The continued vitality and desirability of the essential facilities doctrine 
and related unilateral refusal to deal claims remain hotly debated in the 
United States both before and after Trinko.221 Whatever the answer to those 
questions, most courts and commentators believe that the application of such 
claims to the refusal to license intellectual property rather than physical 
infrastructure type facilities is either barred or limited to the most 
extraordinary circumstances.222 
Current U.S. policy makes the pursuit of cases based on the refusal to 
license intellectual property rights highly unlikely. While one prominent 
case has imposed liability for refusal to license certain IP rights, even that 
court held that a monopolist’s “desire to exclude others from its [protected] 
                                                                                                                     
220 Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
221 Compare RICHARD N. LANGLOIS, Technological Standards, Innovation, and Essential 
Facilities: Toward a Schumpeterian Post-Chicago Approach, in DYNAMIC COMPETITION AND PUBLIC 
POLICY: TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION, AND ANTITRUST ISSUES 1993 (Jerry Ellig ed., 2001), Brett M. 
Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917 
(2005), Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 
1 (2008), Brett M. Frischmann & Mark Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007), Marina 
Lao, Networks, Access, and “Essential Facilities”: From Terminal Railroad to Microsoft, 62 SMU L. 
REV. 557 (2009), Ali A. Massadeh, The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under Scrutiny: EU and US 
Perspective (UEA Law, Working Paper No. 2011-AM-1, 2011), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1738326, Robert Pitofsky et al., The Essential 
Facilities Doctrine under U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443 (2002), and Spencer Weber Waller, 
Areeda, Epithets, and Essential Facilities, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 359 (2008), with Philip Areeda, Essential 
Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1990), Michael Boudin, 
Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of Metaphor, 75 GEO. L.J. 395, 397–403 (1986), and Richard J. Gilbert 
& Carl Shapiro, An Economic Analysis of Unilateral Refusals to License Intellectual Property, 93 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 12,749 (1996); Keith N. Hylton, Economic Rents and Essential Facilities, 1991 
BYU L. REV. 1243 (1991); Allen Kezsbom & Alan V. Goldman, No Shortcut to Antitrust Analysis: The 
Twisted Journey of the “Essential Facilities” Doctrine, 1996 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1187 (1999); Abbot 
B. Lipsky & Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1999); Paul D. Marquandt & 
Mark J. Leddy, The Essential Facilities and Intellectual Property Rights: A Response to Pitofsky, 
Patterson & Hooks, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 847 (2003); David McGowan, Regulating Competition in the 
Information Age: Computer Software as an Essential Facility Under the Sherman Act, 18 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 771 (1996); Gregory J. Werden, The Law and Economics of the Essential Facilities 
Doctrine, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 433 (1987). 
222 See Marquandt & Leddy, supra note 221, at 848 (concluding that, under U.S. law, the essential 
facilities doctrine cannot “properly be applied to require licensing of an intellectual property right merely 
because in the absence of such a license rival firms will be unable to compete with the product 
incorporating the intellectual property”); Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 221, at 12,750–51 (discussing 
the refusal to deal and essential facilities doctrine). 
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work is a presumptively valid business justification.”223 Other decisions 
have come closer to a rule of per se legality.224  
Change is not likely to come from the current U.S. enforcement regime. 
Makan Delrahim is the first head of the Antitrust Division who is also a 
member of the patent bar.225 He is strongly protective of intellectual property 
rights and has been on record against the use of antitrust law to weaken IP 
protection for over twenty years.  
As a member of the 2000 Antitrust Modernization Commission, he 
issued a dissenting opinion from the final AMC report stating: 
In my view, antitrust law and policy must be careful not to 
constrain the legitimate exercise of intellectual property rights. 
The application of antitrust laws must not illegitimately stifle 
creators or innovation by condemning pro-competitive 
activities that would maximize incentives for investments or 
efficiency-maximizing business arrangements. 
Antitrust enforcers should also strive to eliminate as much as 
possible the unnecessary uncertainties for innovators and 
creators in their ability to exploit their intellectual property 
rights, as those uncertainties can also reduce the incentives for 
innovation. Only when the holders of intellectual property 
rights go beyond the legitimate exercise of these rights should 
antitrust law be used to constrain their activities, and only then 
in a manner that is based on sound economic policies.226 
As deputy head of the Antitrust Division in the Bush Administration, 
Delrahim consistently spoke out against forced licensing requirements and 
the dilution of intellectual property.227 As the current head of the Division, 
                                                                                                                     
223 Image Tech. Servs., Ltd. v. Eastern Kodak Co., 125 F. 3d 1195, 1218 (9th Cir. 1997) (quotations 
omitted) (alteration in original); see also Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support, 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 
(1st Cir.1994) (noting that the “Copyright Act does not explicitly purport to limit the Sherman Act” and 
that “silence is particularly acute in cases where a monopolist harms consumers in the monopolized 
market by refusing to license a copyrighted work to competitors”). 
224 See In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (asserting 
“in the absence of . . . proof, we will not inquire into the patentee’s motivations for asserting his statutory 
right to exclude”). 
225 Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Remarks at the USC Gould School 
of Law’s Center for Transnational Law and Business Conference (Nov. 10, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-usc-
gould-school-laws-center; see also James Edwards, Order of the New Day: IP Rights in Dynamic 
Competition, IP WATCHDOG (June 10, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/06/10/order-new-
day-ip-rights-dynamic-competition/id=98212/.  
226 DEBORAH A. GARZA ET AL., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 403, 404–05 (2007) (separate statement of Commissioner Delrahim). 
227 Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., International Antitrust and 
Intellectual Property: Challenges on the Road to Convergence, Remarks at the American Bar Association 
Section of Antitrust Law Conference on Antitrust & Intellectual Property (May 21, 2004), 
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he has given both speeches and testimony arguing for the increased 
protection of intellectual property rights and the need to protect IP creators 
over the competing needs of IP implementors.228 Most recently, over 
seventy-five law professors signed a letter to AAG Delrahim contending that 
his views were not even an accurate statement of U.S. policy on the 
complicated question of the intersection of antitrust and intellectual 
property.229  
The treatment of refusals to deal for both physical assets and intellectual 
property is very different in the European Union, its member states, and 
other jurisdictions which have considered similar situations of a dominant 
firm controlling a resource necessary for competition in its own market or 
an adjacent one. Early in the jurisprudence of the ECJ, the court held that 
the refusal by a dominant firm to supply raw ingredients to a competitor that 
prevented competition in the downstream market for the finished compound 
was an abuse of dominance.230 Failures to grant access to infrastructure such 
as ports, rail lines, and electrical grids were condemned in terms strikingly 
                                                                                                                     
https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/international-antitrust-and-intellectrual-property-challenges-road-
convergence (stressing the need for protection of intellectual property rights in the face of increasing 
globalization); Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Contemporary Issues 
At The Intersection Of Intellectual Property and Antitrust, Remarks at The Fair Competition & Market 
Economy 2004 Shanghai International Forum (Nov. 10, 2004), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/contemporary-issues-intersection-intellectual-property-and-antitrust 
(noting that “the antitrust laws do not serve their proper function if they are used to constrain the 
legitimate exercise of intellectual property rights or to stifle the innovation that is encouraged by a strong 
intellectual property regime”); Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., The 
Long And Winding Road: Convergence In The Application of Antitrust to Intellectual Property, Remarks 
at The George Mason Law Review Symposium (Oct. 6, 2004), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/long-
and-winding-road-convergence-application-antitrust-intellectual-property (urging that “antitrust 
enforcement policies must be carefully designed so they do not interfere with or discourage the legitimate 
exploitation of intellectual property rights through technology licensing”). 
228 See, e.g., Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Remarks at the USC Gould 
School of Law’s Center for Transnational Law and Business Conference (Nov. 10, 2017), supra note 
225; Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Remarks at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing: 
Competition, Intellectual Property, and Economic Prosperity (Feb. 1, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-us-
embassy-beijing; Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Keynote Address at 
University of Pennsylvania Law School, The “New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and Intellectual 
Property Law (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-
delrahim-delivers-keynote-address-university; Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., 
Remarks at the National Music Publishers Association Annual Meeting (June 13, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-
national-music-publishers. 
229 Michael A. Carrier et al., 7 Former Government Officials and Professors Remind Assistant AG 
Delrahim of Long-Standing U.S. Policy on Standard-Essential Patents, FOSS PATS. (May 18, 2018), 
www.fosspatents.com/2018/05/77-former-government-officials-and.html.  
230 Case 6/73, Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Comm’n, 1974 E.C.R. 223, 1 C.M.L.R. 309. See also 
Case IV/32.279, BBI v. Boosey & Hawkes plc, 1987 O.J. (L 286/36) 42, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 67. 
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similar to the U.S. essential facilities doctrine.231 As in the United States, 
liability was rejected where the facility or resource controlled by the 
dominant firm was not truly essential or where the resource practically could 
be duplicated by the competitor.232 Many of the national competition 
authorities of the EU member states have applied these principles to require 
access by competitors or new entrants to more local essential infrastructure 
such as transportation and burial grounds.233 
The EU has extended this doctrine to require access to intellectual 
property as well as physical resources. In Magill, the ECJ required Irish 
television stations to license their copyrighted program schedules to a new 
competitor seeking to aggregate the listings to create a multichannel 
viewer’s guide.234 In IMS, this right of access was extended to require 
licensing of a copyrighted data structure to a competitor in order to directly 
compete with the dominant firm in the sale of health care information to 
pharmaceutical companies.235 In Microsoft, the General Court applied 
perhaps the most expansive version of the EU essential facilities doctrine to 
require the respondent to license interoperability information for its server 
operating system to competitors.236 A similarly expansive view was shown 
in an English Court of Appeals decision that the failure to license certain 
patents could constitute an unlawful abuse of dominance under Article 
102.237 
Other jurisdictions have adopted some version of the essential facilities 
doctrine for both physical resources as well as intellectual property rights. 
Within the EU, the UK, Germany, the Czech Republic, Austria, Cyrus, 
Estonia, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, and Lithuania have all applied versions 
of the doctrine to impose liability and/or require access or interconnection.238 
Elsewhere countries as diverse as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, Israel, Japan, Guatemala, Mexico, New Zealand, the People’s 
Republic of China, Peru, Turkey, Russia, and South Africa have used 
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233 See Spencer Weber Waller & William Tasch, Harmonizing Essential Facilities, 76 ANTITRUST 
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237 Cases A3/2002/1380 & A3/2002/1381, Intel Corp. v. Via Techs. Inc., [2002] EWCA Civ. 1905. 
238 Amadeo Arena, The Italian Council of State Rules on the Issue of Dominant Firms’ Duty to 
Supply Essential Information Beyond the Requirements of Sector Regulation (BCS), E-COMPETITIONS, 
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164 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1 
statutes, regulations, case law, and guidelines to penalize unilateral refusals 
to deal and require access and interconnection.239 For example, Pakistan has 
explicitly referred to the U.S. essential facilities doctrine in requiring access 
to a stock exchange.240 
The litigation over the Microsoft browser wars also produced decisions 
outside the United States and the EU requiring the granting of access to 
intellectual property rights. In Korea, the Korean Fair Trade Commission 
(KFTC) imposed a fine and (1) ordered Microsoft to sell in Korea a version 
of its Windows operating system that includes neither Windows Media 
Player nor Windows Messenger functionality; (2) required that Microsoft 
facilitate consumer downloads of third party media player and messenger 
products selected by the Commission; and (3) prohibited Microsoft from 
selling in Korea a version of its server software that includes Windows 
Media Services.241 The U.S. Department of Justice again criticized the 
KFTC decision and remedy as going “beyond what is necessary or 
appropriate to protect consumers, as it requires the removal of products that 
consumers may prefer.”242 
In subsequent Microsoft disputes and matters involving other 
companies, China has required licensing of intellectual property rights and 
changes in royalty amounts in both merger and conduct cases.243 It is also 
worth noting that regardless of current U.S. enforcement practices, the little-
used Article 40 of the TRIPs agreement of the World Trade Organization 
expressly permits the licensing of intellectual property rights as a remedy 
for violations of competition law.244 
                                                                                                                     
239 Waller & Tasch, Harmonizing Essential Facilities, supra note 233, at 752–58. See also JOSE 
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243 See generally Zhaoqi Cen, China, in THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST REVIEW 
23 (Thomas Vinje ed., 3d ed. 2018) (discussing IP law in China); Yee Wah Chin, Intellectual Property 
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The divergence over the proper standards for single firm conduct is the 
most widely acknowledged of the gaps between U.S. views and the rest of 
the world. I now turn to what is considered the proper domain for 
competition law, where again the United States finds itself increasingly an 
outlier.  
II. THE DOMAIN OF COMPETITION LAW 
The United States defines the antitrust laws as the substantive provisions 
of the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission acts along with a 
small number of subsidiary statutes. This limits the scope of antitrust law to 
agreements between competitors, monopolization law, and the review of 
potentially harmful mergers and acquisitions. In contrast, the EU and other 
jurisdictions have led the world to a broader understanding of the meaning 
and reach of competition law that is only partially understood or appreciated 
in the United States.245 This Section explores that broader vision of 
competition including market studies and investigations; prohibitions 
against public anticompetitive conduct; state aids; and the use of public 
interest factors normally not part of the U.S. vision of the antitrust enterprise. 
A. Market Studies and Market Investigations 
The competition toolkit for many jurisdictions also includes provisions 
for market studies in addition to specific enforcement actions. As noted by 
the OECD: 
Market studies assess whether competition in a market is 
working efficiently, and identify measures to address any 
issues that are identified. These measures can include 
recommendations such as proposals for regulatory reform or 
improving information dissemination amongst consumers. 
They can also include the opening of antitrust 
investigations.246 
These analyses are used to identify restraints to competitions which are 
not limited to outright violations of existing competition laws247 and are used 
for competition advocacy, pre-enforcement information gathering, ex-post 
assessments, law reform, and the creation of new legal regimes on an 
industry specific basis.248  
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Fox 1–2 (Mar. 22, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
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In recent years, the OECD has held roundtable workshops, conducted 
surveys of past and current market studies, and worked with individual 
jurisdictions regarding this valuable tool of competition policy and 
advocacy.249 The World Bank and the International Competition Network 
also have been active in this area and provided financial support and 
technical assistance to smaller and developing jurisdictions seeking to 
conduct appropriate market studies in numerous industries including 
financial services, food retailing, and telecommunications.250 
A 2016 OECD survey indicated that sixty-eight percent of jurisdictions 
surveyed had specific powers to undertake such surveys and another twenty-
six percent relied on more general competition powers to do so.251 Eighty-
seven percent of the respondents reported that recommendations to the 
government for changes in laws, regulations, or public policies were one of 
the potential outcomes for such inquiries.252 In some jurisdictions, the 
sectoral regulators have such powers either alone or in conjunction with the 
competition authority.253 
On several occasions, the result has been the creation of a sectoral 
specific code of competition fine-tuned for industry characteristics and the 
nature of the competitive issues. One example is the United Kingdom which, 
after an extensive market investigation254 of the supermarket industry, 
created an industry code of conduct with specific rules for supplier-
supermarket relations, a dispute resolution procedure, and an ombudsman.255 
Similarly, Australia has specific industry codes for competition for 
franchising, horticulture, groceries, wheat, and oil.256 Australia also has a 
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250 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE ROLE OF MARKET STUDIES AS A TOOL TO 
PROMOTE COMPETITION 4 (2016), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/GF(2016)4/en/pdf 
[hereinafter OECD MARKET STUDY SURVEY]; see also Market Studies Information Store, INT’L 
COMPETITION NETWORK, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/working-
groups/current/advocacy/amsis/sectors.aspx (listing market studies by sector and jurisdiction). 
251 OECD MARKET STUDY SURVEY, supra note 250, at 9. 
252 Id. at 8. 
253 Id. at 10. 
254 See id. at 17 (discussing the technical distinctions between market studies and market 
investigations). 
255 COMPETITION COMMISSION, SUPERMARKETS: A REPORT ON THE SUPPLY OF GROCERIES FROM 
MULTIPLE STORES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 2000 (UK), 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.competition-commission.org.uk//rep_pub/ 
reports/2000/446super.htm. See generally Paul W. Dobson, Exploiting Buyer Power: Lessons from the 
British Grocery Trade, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 529 (2005) (providing an overview of how “increased 
concentration in grocery retailing in Great Britain has raised issues about the buying power of multiple 
retailers”). See also Press Release, Competition & Mkt. Auth., CMA Investigates Funerals Sector (June 
1, 2018) (UK), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-investigates-funerals-sector (announcing 
most recent CMA market study).  
256 Franchising Code of Conduct, Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes, Franchising) 
Regulation 2014, made under Competition and Consumer Act 2010, reg. 168 (Austl.); Horticulture Code 
of Conduct, Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes, Horticulture) Regulation 2017, made under 
 
 
2020] THE OMEGA MAN 167 
separate statutory provision permitting the creation of access provisions to 
designated infrastructure.257 
In contrast, the United States competition agencies have more limited 
powers and appetite to conduct such studies and no current ability to 
consider whether antitrust enforcement actions or an industry specific code 
would be an appropriate response. The Justice Department has no statutory 
powers to require the production of business information outside of a 
specific enforcement action. This is extremely rare. In the 2016 OECD 
survey of sixty competition authorities, only the U.S. Justice Department 
and Hong Kong lacked the power to request such information.258 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has such powers, but chooses to 
use them in a more limited fashion. Section 46 of the FTC Act provides the 
Commission with the power to “gather and compile information concerning, 
and to investigate from time to time the organization, business, conduct, 
practices, and management of any person, partnership, or corporation 
engaged in or whose business affects commerce, [exempting certain 
industries] . . . and its relation to other persons, partnerships, and 
corporations.”259 
While it is conceivable that section 46 could be used to conduct broader 
market studies of concentrated industries and the contemplation of industry 
specific antitrust rules, the FTC has not chosen to do so in recent years. Since 
2006, the FTC has used section 46 to produce thoughtful reports to analyze 
such issues as E-cigarettes,260 cigarette and smokeless tobacco data 
collection,261 merger divestiture remedies,262 food and beverage marketing 
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to children,263 homeowners insurance,264 automobile insurance,265 alcoholic 
beverage advertising,266 patent assertion entities,267 generic drugs,268 
consumer fraud,269 and data sharing practices among corporate affiliates.270 
This list includes numerous important consumer protection matters and 
certain competition issues that cut across industry lines (patent trolls and 
merger remedies)271 but only one specific competition-related study of a 
particular industry (generic drugs).272 This valuable study included 
proposals for legislative reform for vexing problems with the gaming of the 
system for the introduction and approval of generic drugs.273 
The United States’ experience with sector specific antitrust codes is 
largely limited to the 1921 Packer and Stockyard Act274 which was enacted 
because of Progressive Era concerns with the imbalance of power between 
small livestock producers as sellers and the large concentrated (and often 
colluding) meat packers as buyers. Even here, government failure to update 
the regulations under this act for modern times and judicial reinterpretation 
of the Act to more closely track the general antitrust laws has made this 
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experiment a highly criticized and mostly ineffective tool to achieve its 
intended purpose.275 
B. Competition and the Public Sector 
The United States tends to view antitrust law as a narrow and specialized 
field applying only to private economic activity. U.S. antitrust does not reach 
most restraints on competition imposed by the federal, state, or local 
government. Restraints on competition imposed by the U.S. Congress are 
immune from the antitrust law so long as the intent of Congress is clear to 
achieve some result at odds with the baseline rules of the antitrust laws.276  
Restraints by state governments are immune from the antitrust law under 
the antitrust “state action” doctrine where the state has clearly articulated a 
policy of something other than the competition otherwise mandated by the 
federal antitrust laws.277 The Supreme Court justified this sweeping 
judicially-created exception to the antitrust laws on the grounds that the 
Sherman and Clayton acts were intended to regulate private market conduct, 
and not sovereign state government.278 To do otherwise also would raise 
important federalism concerns under the Constitution.279  
Anticompetitive private conduct pursuant to immune state action would 
also be protected so long as the state further actively supervised the private 
conduct in question.280 Otherwise unlawful local government action would 
be similarly protected if the local government had been delegated the power 
to regulate the activity in question by the state through constitutional, 
legislative, or judicial decision.281 Moreover, local governments are immune 
from most damage awards under the antitrust laws, and are only subject to 
prospective injunctive relief.282 
The domain of competition law is substantially broader outside the 
United States. From its inception, the EU has applied its competition law to 
the public sector and private firms receiving special privileges from the state, 
rather than shielding such firms as in the United States.  
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This decision relates to a combination of factors. These include the 
historically larger role of the public sector in most of the member states, the 
legacy of state enterprises in the former socialist Eastern European member 
states, and the existence of numerous privatized undertakings that still 
enjoyed a dominant position through their control of formerly public 
infrastructure.  
Article 106 of the TFEU sets forth the ground rules for the application 
of the EU competition rules to public enterprises and private undertaking 
enjoying special privileges. It states: 
1. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which 
Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Member 
States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure 
contrary to the rules contained in the Treaties, in particular to 
those rules provided for in Article 18 and Articles 101 to 109 
[the competition rules]. 
2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of 
general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-
producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in 
the Treaties, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far 
as the application of such rules does not obstruct the 
performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned 
to them. The development of trade must not be affected to such 
an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Union. 
3. The Commission shall ensure the application of the 
provisions of this Article and shall, where necessary, address 
appropriate directives or decisions to Member States.283 
These rules are vigorously enforced by the Commission and the ECJ.284 
The EU Commission has also enacted a number of regulations under Article 
106(3) to affirmatively facilitate competition in industries such as 
telecommunications and other forms of infrastructure.285 
C. State Aids as Competition Law 
The EU rules on state aids as part of competition law are equally 
unfamiliar in the U.S. context. Article 107 of the TFEU states:  
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Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by 
a Member State or through State resources in any form 
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition 
by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain 
goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member 
States, be incompatible with the internal market.286  
The treaty spells out certain automatic and discretionary exceptions to 
permit member states to address poverty, regional economic development, 
environmental concerns, and other social needs that are not likely to distort 
competition within the EU.287 The EU Commission reviews all state aids in 
conjunction with the member states.  
If, after giving notice to the parties concerned to submit their 
comments, the Commission finds that aid granted by a State 
or through State resources is not compatible with the internal 
market . . . , or that such aid is being misused, it shall decide 
that the State concerned shall abolish or alter such aid within 
a period of time to be determined by the Commission.288  
Regulations can be adopted by the Commission, and exemptions can be 
adopted through a proposal of the Commission and granted by the Council 
of Ministers in consultation with the European Parliament.289 
A vast and complicated jurisprudence has arisen as to when and how 
state aids to undertakings are incompatible with the provisions of Article 
107. At the risk of oversimplifying, state aids are unlawful if they provide 
benefits on terms more favorable than the undertaking could obtain in the 
private sector.290 This can apply to outright grants, below market loans or 
other financing, tax concessions, or any other tangible benefit on below 
market terms. State aids found to be incompatible with the common market 
are required to be clawed back by the member state from the recipient. One 
recent example is the EU Commission’s controversial decision that tax 
concessions granted to Apple by the Republic of Ireland were incompatible 
with the common market and capable of distorting competition.291 Other 
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pending state aid investigations and decisions relating to tax concessions 
focus on Amazon and Starbucks, among other U.S. corporations.292 
Certain EU member states also have their own national state aids 
provisions. Countries like Ukraine are obliged to enforce state aids 
provisions as part of preferential trade agreements with the EU.293 Ironically, 
the United Kingdom does not currently have state aids as part of the CMA’s 
competition toolkit but will be adopting such provisions as part of the Brexit 
process along with a significant increase in its staff to enforce these 
provisions.294 
Outside the EU, there is a wide mixture of practices as to state aids as 
part of the competition toolbox. State aids provisions are most common in 
regional trade agreements to ensure competitive neutrality among members 
of the trading bloc.295 Other jurisdictions bar state aids which affect 
competitive neutrality within their national economies.296 
The United States simply lacks this important tool. As a result, states 
vigorously compete with each other to provide incentives to lure or retain 
businesses within their territory usually to the net detriment of the taxpayers 
of that state.297 
D. Public Interest Factors 
Statutes providing a national government, ministry, or competition 
agency the explicit power to sacrifice competition for national security, 
employment, or some other significant public interest are common outside 
the United States. Such “public interest” overrides are most common in 
merger review, but certain jurisdictions have such provisions for 
anticompetitive agreements and/or abuse of dominance cases as well. 
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The EU has a provision that has been used for public interest purposes 
in the past. Article 101(3) of the TFEU provides: 
The provisions of [Article 101(1)] may, however, be declared 
inapplicable in the case of: 
– any agreement or category of agreements between 
undertakings, 
– any decision or category of decisions by associations of 
undertakings, 
– any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution 
of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, 
while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, 
and which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which 
are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating 
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in 
question.298  
This provision has been used to exempt otherwise anticompetitive 
agreements which violated Article 101(3) in order to validate so-called crisis 
cartels, deal with the Arab oil embargo, promote environmental goals, and 
deal with other public interest factors that go beyond the effect of an 
agreement on competition.299 While Article 101(3) is rarely used recently in 
this manner, it remains a potent weapon for future court cases and decisions 
of national competition authorities. 
Numerous jurisdictions have public interest standards in their merger 
laws allowing the approval or rejection of transactions on grounds other than 
their competitive effects.300 One of the most prominent is the Republic of 
South Africa, which introduced the modern form of its competition law in 
1998 as part of the post-apartheid legal and political regime.301 
                                                                                                                     
298 TFEU art. 101(3); see also id. art. 346 (addressing national security). 
299 2 WALLER & FIEBIG, supra note 285, ch. 17; RICHARD WHISH & DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION 
LAW 166–68 (Oxford Univ. Press 9th ed. 2018); Andre Fiebig, Crisis Cartels and the Triumph of 
Industrial Policy Over Competition Law in Europe, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 607, 622–23 (1999). 
300 DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS, COMPETITION CO., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION 
& DEV., SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION OF THE ROUNDTABLE ON PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS IN 
MERGER CONTROL 2 (2017), 
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WP3/M(2016)1/ANN4/FINAL/en/pdf.  
301 See Guidelines on the Assessment of Public Interest Provisions in the Merger Regulation Under 
the Competition Act No. 89 of 1998, GN 309 of GG 40039 (2 June 2016), 
http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Gov-Gazette-Public-Interest-Guidlines.pdf 
(“These guidelines seek to provide guidance regarding the Commission’s approach to analyzing mergers 
by indicating the approach that the Commission is likely to follow and the types of information that the 
Commission may require when evaluating public interest grounds . . . .”).  
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The economic empowerment of the previously oppressed black majority 
population was a critical goal of the competition regime.302 As a result, the 
South African merger regime permits anticompetitive mergers to be 
approved on specified public interest grounds.303 The law also permits the 
denial on public interest grounds of mergers that are otherwise innocuous 
with respect to competition.304 
In addition to the effect on competition, the South African merger 
regime also requires consideration of the merger’s effect on: 
1) A particular industrial sector or region; 
2) Employment; 
3) The ability of small businesses or firms controlled by 
black persons to become competitive; and  
4) The ability of national industries to compete in 
international markets.305  
The South African Competition Commission has issued guidelines to 
implement this additional facet of their merger control regime, 306 and the 
competition tribunal has applied the statute and guidelines in key case law.307 
Similar public interest standards exist in such diverse competition regimes 
as Malawi and New Zealand, and are often a key component of the political 
support behind the enactment of competition law in the first place in such 
jurisdictions.308 
U.S. statutes and case law do not permit the consideration of such 
general social welfare factors in an antitrust case. In the Professional 
Engineers case, the U.S. Supreme Court summarily rejected the defendant’s 
proposed affirmative defense that the competitive bidding process for public 
                                                                                                                     
302 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA: 
AN OECD PEER REVIEW 3–4, 7, 9 (2003), 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/prosecutionandlawenforcement/2958714.pdf. 
303 Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 12A (S. Afr.). 
304 Id. 
305 Id. 
306 Guidelines on the Assessment of Public Interest Provisions in the Merger Regulation Under the 
Competition Act No. 89 of 1998, GN 309 of GG 40039 (2 June 2016), http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/Gov-Gazette-Public-Interest-Guidlines.pdf. 
307 In the large merger between Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd. and Tepco Petroleum (Pty) Ltd. 2002 
1 (Tribunal)at 9 para. 36 (S. Afr.); Minister of Econ. Dev. & Others v. Competition Tribunal & Others, 
S. African Commercial, Catering & Allied Workers Union (SACCAWU) v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc. & 
Another 2012 1 (ZACAC 2) at 8 para. 11, 69 para. 110, 111 (S. Afr.). See also Michael-James Currie, 
South Africa Competition Tribunal: Merging Parties Penalised for Failure to Comply with Public 
Interest Conditions, AFRICAN ANTITRUST & COMPETITION L., 
https://africanantitrust.com/2018/07/03/south-africa-competition-tribunal-merging-parties-penalised-
for-failure-to-comply-with-public-interest-conditions/amp/?__twitter_impression=true (last accessed 
Aug. 17, 2019) (penalizing merging parties for not complying with monitoring conditions of post-merger 
employment). 
308 Competition & Fair Trading Act 1998, §§ 35–38 (Malawi), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/mw/mw003en.pdf; Commerce Act 1986, s 3A (N.Z.). 
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works could produce a threat to public safety in the form of shoddy 
engineering work by unscrupulous engineers making unrealistic low ball 
bids and potentially using substandard materials or construction 
techniques.309 This could be true in particular instances, but it was legally 
irrelevant to the court.310 It was legally irrelevant as well in earlier cases (1) 
that competition might not be an appropriate public policy for certain 
industries or (2) that the defendants in fact agreed upon a reasonable price.311  
Similarly, the United States does not have public interest standards 
incorporated into its merger laws. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits 
those mergers and acquisitions which may tend to substantially lessen 
competition or may tend to create a monopoly.312 The Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines and the limited modern case law do not allow for consideration 
of other important social factors such as employment, economic 
development, environmental effects, racial justice, or other public factors in 
the analysis of the competitive effects of a proposed or consummated 
transaction.313 While certain commentators have advocated for more explicit 
use of public interest standards in U.S. antitrust policy more generally and 
in merger policy in particular,314 change in this direction seems unlikely for 
the foreseeable future.  
While the United States does not have public interest standards in its 
merger regime, certain mergers in regulated industries may be subject to 
approval by sectoral regulators that do have explicit “public interest” 
powers. One prominent example is the Federal Communication 
Commission, which must consider the effect on both competition and the 
public interest in considering a media merger subject to its jurisdiction.315 
Similarly, the banking agencies may also consider the broader public interest 
in addition to competitive effects in considering a merger or acquisition 
within their jurisdiction.316 
                                                                                                                     
309 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 684–85, 692 (1978). 
310 Id. at 692. 
311 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397–98 (1927); United States v. Addyston 
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283–87, 293 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); United States v. 
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 320–27 (1897). 
312 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
313 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2010), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf (providing 
guidelines on how the agencies determine anticompetitive behavior with no mention of examining 
important social factors such as employment, economic development, environmental effects, and racial 
justice). 
314 See generally MAURICE E. STUCKE & ARIEL EZRACHI, COMPETITION OVERDOSE (forthcoming 
Mar. 17, 2020) (using examples to illustrate how society overprescribed competition as a solution); 
Richard Brunell, The Social Costs of Mergers: Restoring Local Control as a Factor in Merger Policy, 
85 N.C. L. REV. 149 (2006) (maintaining that “the loss of local control should be restored as a factor in 
merger policy”). 
315 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
316 Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (2012). 
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The United States also has rarely used statutes allowing non-competition 
factors to supersede competitive analysis to achieve national security 
objectives. Mergers may be blocked on national security grounds even if 
cleared by the competition agencies.317 In addition, the Defense Production 
Act of 1950 (DPA) allows the President to exempt agreements between 
private parties from the application of the antitrust laws where such action 
was taken for the national defense.318  
It is important to note that even in the limited situations where a broader 
public interest is applied, such a process is assigned outside of the 
competition agencies. This is in marked contrast to the practice of 
jurisdictions such as South Africa and elsewhere where the competition 
agencies and tribunals integrate both competition and public interest criteria 
into the analysis of a particular transaction or practice. 
III. ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURES 
While there are a wide diversity of public agency structures for the 
competition law enforcement, the United States sticks out like a bit of a sore 
thumb. The United States has a unique system of two partially overlapping 
agencies: the FTC, which has jurisdiction over both competition and 
consumer cases, and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, which 
investigates and brings only competition cases.319 The FTC has jurisdiction 
over the civil enforcement of competition cases, while the Antitrust Division 
has both civil and criminal enforcement powers and is the sole enforcer of 
criminal antitrust cases.320 The Antitrust Division has authority to bring 
cases under the Sherman Act and Clayton Act, while the FTC brings its 
actions under section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits “unfair methods of 
competition.”321 Section 5 of the FTC Act has been interpreted to cover all 
violations of the Sherman and Clayton acts as well as a vague penumbra of 
unfair practices that consist of incipient violations of the antitrust laws or 
violations of the spirit of those provisions.322 
The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department brings its cases in 
federal court before the United States District Court that has personal 
jurisdiction and venue over the defendants charged with a civil or criminal 
                                                                                                                     
317 Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(4)(A), (d) (2012).  
318 50 U.S.C. §§ 4558(j), 4565(d) (2012). 
319 Guide to Antitrust Laws: The Enforcers, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/enforcers (last visited Aug. 25, 2019). 
320 Id. 
321 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012). 
322 FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 235 (1972); Donald S. Clark, Statement of 
Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition” Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, 
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antitrust violation. The U.S. FTC brings most of its merger cases directly in 
federal district court in the same manner.323 The FTC also brings certain 
cases through an internal administrative procedure where the losing 
respondent can appeal to the relevant appellate court.324 To make matters 
more confusing, the standards for a preliminary injunction in a merger case 
in administrative FTC litigation are slightly different from the standards in 
federal district court. There is pending legislation that would harmonize the 
two standards in favor of the more stringent district court standards.325  
While the two agencies have similar enforcement powers in civil 
antitrust matters, they have different origins and structures. The Antitrust 
Division is part of the U.S. Justice Department, itself part of the Executive 
Branch.326 The head of the Antitrust Division holds the title of an Assistant 
Attorney General, is selected by the Attorney General with the concurrence 
of the President, and is subject to confirmation by the U.S. Senate.327 The 
Deputy Assistant Attorneys General in charge of the various operating 
sections of the Antitrust Division are selected by the head of the Antitrust 
Division and are also subject to Senate confirmation.328 
In contrast, the Federal Trade Commission is an independent federal 
agency subject to the Administrative Procedures Act,329 the Sunshine in 
Government Act,330 and other legal constraints similar to the plethora of 
other administrative agencies in the federal government. The FTC is headed 
by five presidentially appointed commissioners, no more than three of which 
can be members of the same party as the President.331 Each commissioner is 
subject to Senate confirmation and may not be removed from office during 
their seven-year term except for good cause.332 
This means that the United States has two strikingly similar agencies, 
one subject to the normal constraints of administrative law and the other not, 
despite a substantial overlap of function.333 The two agencies consult 
informally with each other to assign all new investigations and merger 
                                                                                                                     
323 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (2012). 
324 16 C.F.R. § 3.52 (2018). 
325 Standard Merger and Acquisition Reviews Through Equal Rules Act of 2018, H.R. 5645, 115th 
Cong. § 2 (2018); S. 2847, 115th Cong. (2018). 
326 Organization, Mission and Functions Manual: Antitrust Division, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/jmd/organization-mission-and-functions-manual-antitrust-division (last visited 
Aug. 27, 2019). 
327 Assistant Attorney General, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/atr/assistant-attorney-
general (last visited Aug. 27, 2019). 
328 28 U.S.C. § 506 (2012). 
329 Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–96 (1946). 
330 Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976). 
331 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1950). 
332 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 602 (1935). 
333 Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust 
Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1387 (1998). 
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reviews so only one agency will investigate any individual matter, but 
Congress blocked formalizing such arrangements.334 While both agencies 
view their mission as law enforcement, they each undertake a large number 
of similar more regulatory functions such as issuing guidelines and advisory 
opinions, engaging in competition advocacy, conducting research, 
presenting workshops, participating in interagency decision making, and 
representing the United States in various international organizations, 
consultations, and negotiations. Not surprisingly, this unique situation has 
led to numerous proposals to unify competition enforcement within a single 
agency with some favoring consolidation in the FTC and others in the Justice 
Department.335 
It is more than just the dual nature of federal antitrust enforcement that 
distinguishes the United States from the rest of the world. In the past, both 
Brazil and China have had more than one competition law enforcer, but 
Brazil has recently consolidated enforcement in a single agency and China 
is in the process of doing so.336 
Nor is it the main issue whether to combine competition and consumer 
protection within one agency or split them between two specialist agencies. 
There is no single right answer on this important question of institutional 
design upon which reasonable people can differ.337 Over time, competition 
agencies have added and shed related consumer protection jurisdiction, and 
strong arguments can be made in favor of each model.338  
                                                                                                                     
334 Justin O’Neill Kay, Clearance: The Back Story and Looking Forward, ANTITRUST SOURCE, 
Aug. 2012, at 12; FTC and DOJ Announce New Clearance Procedures for Antitrust Matters: 
Memorandum of Agreement Allocates Industry Sectors Between Agencies, FED. TRADE COMMISSION 
(Mar. 5, 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2002/03/ftc-and-doj-announce-new-
clearance-procedures-antitrust-matters.  
335 Darren Bush, Out of the DOJ Ashes Rises the FTC Phoenix: How to Enhance Antitrust 
Enforcement by Eliminating an Antitrust Enforcement Agency, 53 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 33, 52 (2016); 
Waller, supra note 333; Ernest Gellhorn et al., Has Antitrust Outgrown Dual Enforcement? A Proposal 
for Rationalization, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 695, 702 (1990). 
336 Decreto No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
5.2012 (Braz.) (structuring the Brazilian System for Protection of Competition and setting forth 
preventive measures and sanctions for violations against the economic order); see also ANA PAULA 
MARTINEZ & MARIANA TAVERES DE ARAUJO, OVERVIEW OF COMPETITION LAW IN BRAZIL 257–58 
(Cristianne Zarzur et al. eds., 2015) (explaining the current structure of Brazil’s competition law); Adrian 
Emch, China to Merge Antitrust Authorities, KLUWER COMPETITION L. BLOG (Mar. 21, 2018), 
http://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2018/03/21/china-merge-antitrust-authorities/ 
(discussing Chinese antitrust authorities).  
337 See generally Symposium, A Comparative Analysis of Antitrust Law Regimes: Designing Better 
Institutions for Deciding Antitrust Issues, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 411 (2010) (discussing multiple 
viewpoints on this issue); Spencer W. Waller, Antitrust Marathon IV: With Authority, 6 EUR. COMP. J. 1 
(2010) (same). 
338 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD POLICY ROUNDTABLES: THE INTERFACE 
BETWEEN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER POLICIES 10 (2008), 
http://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/40898016.pdf (executive summary of debate regarding the 
interface between competition and consumer policies and the ideal institutional design of competition 
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It is rather the center of decision authority that is the most important 
difference between the United States and the rest of the world. The U.S. 
system is primarily, but not exclusively, court based with the competition 
agencies having to investigate a case with the goal of proving its case before 
its independent federal district court judge enjoying life tenure and other 
attributes of constitutionally guaranteed judicial independence.339 
The U.S. agencies are first and foremost litigators having to prove their 
cases before generalist judges in federal court to prevail. The Department of 
Justice must bring all of its cases, both criminal and civil, in federal district 
court. In civil cases, it is subject to the same rules of procedure and evidence 
and the same burdens of pleadings, production, and proof as any other 
litigant. The same is true for any merger case brought by the Federal Trade 
Commission. In criminal cases, the Department of Justice is subject to the 
same federal rules of criminal procedure and federal rules of evidence and 
has the higher burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This is in marked difference to the agency-centered model in most other 
jurisdictions. In the EU and most member states, the competition agency 
combines most, if not all, functions of investigation, litigation, adjudication, 
and determination of remedy. This is true for mergers, abuse of dominance, 
and most conduct cases, even those imposing extraordinarily large civil or 
administrative fines. This has led to a broad body of criticism of such 
agencies acting as prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner in the same case 
and calls for greater separation of functions and greater use of independent 
hearing officers and other reforms.340 Only the rare purely criminal case 
outside the United States would be brought in the general court systems.341 
These differences between the agency-centered and court based models 
are also reflected in the nature of judicial review in the United States and 
abroad. The losing party in a federal district court trial may appeal a final 
judgment to the appropriate federal circuit court of appeals and if 
unsuccessful seek discretionary review in the United States Supreme 
                                                                                                                     
policy); DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS, COMPETITION COMM., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., SUMMARY RECORD: ANNEX TO THE SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 123RD MEETING 
OF THE COMPETITION COMMITTEE HELD ON 15-19 JUNE 2015, at 2 (2015), 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/M(2015)1/ANN
9/FINAL&docLanguage=En (describing the “key points of the roundtables on changes in institutional 
design”); Model Law on Competition (2015) – Revised Chapter VIII, 6–7, ICN, U.N. Doc. 
TD/RBF/CONF.8/L.3, (May 21, 2015), 
http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/tdrbpconf8l3_en.pdf.  
339 U.S. CONST. art. III. 
340 Maciej Bernatt, McWane and Judicial Review of Federal Trade Commission Decisions: Any 
Inspirations for EU Competition Law?, 38 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 288, 289 (2017). 
341 In civil administrative FTC matters, the procedure is somewhat closer to the agency model, but 
important safeguards exist along with separation of function between the agency staff investigating and 
ligating cases and the commissioners adjudicating them. 1 STEPHANIE KANWIT, FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION § 8.3 (2018 ed.). 
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Court.342 Factual findings by juries or by judges in bench trials are subject 
to limited appellate review, but rulings of law are subject to de novo review 
on appeal.343 The limited number of FTC administrative decisions in the 
competition area are appealable by a losing respondent to the federal court 
of appeals, and its factual findings and mixed findings of law and fact 
normally are granted a measure of discretion and upheld if supported by 
substantial evidence.344 
Judicial review is a fundamental aspect of due process and is present in 
virtually every legal system, but it often proceeds very differently than in the 
United States. The EU system is a common system often replicated in 
member states and other jurisdictions. The respondent may appeal an 
adverse decision from the European Commission, an integrated agency, to 
the General Court and then the Court of Justice. However, the General Court 
grants substantial deference to the agency’s determination of the application 
of law and economics to the facts of the case.345 In the EU, this is referred to 
as the margin of discretion for complex economic evaluations.346 The ECJ’s 
jurisdiction is then limited to matters of law. The combination of an 
integrated agency structure, hefty fines, and lack of full de novo appellate 
review has led to criticisms of violations of fundamental notions of due 
process and human rights in such systems.347 These concerns are amplified 
in any country where neither the competition agency nor the reviewing court 
may have great expertise in competition matters nor substantial 
independence from the more political branches of government. 
In certain other judicial systems, competition law disputes are handled 
by specialist tribunals and courts that include both competition law experts 
and economists. For example, in Chile the government brings its cases 
before a five-person expert tribunal that includes both expert competition 
lawyers and economists.348 The tribunal also hears certain private 
competition law claims for damages. Decisions of the tribunal are appealed 
                                                                                                                     
342 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (certiorari from decisions of circuit courts of appeal); id. § 1257 (certiorari 
from decisions of highest state court); id. § 1291 (appeal to circuit courts from final judgments of district 
courts). 
343 U.S. CONST. art. VII (declaring that “no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in 
any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law”). 
344 McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 824 (11th Cir. 2015). 
345 Microsoft EU, supra note 152, ¶¶ 87–89.  
346 Bernatt, supra note 340, at 289.  
347 See Maciej Bernatt, The Compatibility of Deferential Standard of Judicial Review in the EU 
Competition Proceedings with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1 (Loyola Univ. 
Chi. Sch. of Law Inst. for Antitrust & Consumer Studies, Working Paper, 2014),  
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the deferential standard of review and surveying literature and suggesting that degree of appellate 
deference be tied to independence and separation of functions at initial trial or hearing). 
348 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CHILE-ACCESSION REPORT ON COMPETITION LAW 
AND POLICY 30–31, https://www.oecd.org/daf/47950954.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2017). 
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to the Chilean Supreme Court.349 In still other systems, complaints are 
resolved through administrative proceedings in the national competition 
authority itself and then appealed to an expert tribunal.350  
In other legal systems, there is a mix as to the matters that are heard by 
specialized tribunals and generalist courts. In the UK, the specialized 
Competition Appeals Tribunal hears all challenges to decisions of the 
Competition and Markets Authority and also hears certain private 
competition law damage actions.351 The general civil courts hear all other 
private competition disputes for damages or injunctive relief or where 
competition issues arise as a defense in related litigation.352 The general 
criminal courts hear the limited number of criminal cases that have been 
brought in the UK.353  
As former FTC Chair William Kovacic has noted: 
Relatively few of the 130 jurisdictions with competition laws 
have adopted the U.S. litigation model and its supporting 
institutions. The EU administrative enforcement regime is by 
far the world’s dominant “operating system.” Nearly 80 
percent of the world’s competition systems rely on an 
administrative agency that takes decisions and imposes 
sanctions subject to judicial review. Many countries have 
adopted his [sic] model to facilitate accession to the European 
Union. The administrative model also is more attractive to, and 
compatible with, the civil law regime that most of the world’s 
countries employ.354 
Regardless of the merits of the U.S. litigation-based model, it remains 
an outlier. 
IV. REMEDIES AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
The United States has an almost unique system of competition remedies 
with its heavy reliance on public criminal enforcement and private treble 
damage litigation. In contrast, most other jurisdictions rely on a civil 
administrative system of fines, limited criminal prosecutions, and a nascent 
system of private damage litigation. 
                                                                                                                     
349 Id. at 30. 
350 See Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, s 75 (Can.) (discussing the matters reviewable by the 
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A. Criminal Enforcement 
The United States is virtually alone with its reliance on criminal 
enforcement as the primary remedy for hard-core cartel enforcement. The 
United States helped form a consensus within the OECD to create a 
recommendation against hard-core cartel.355 This is a soft law instrument 
that does not require criminal penalties, but instead recommends the 
adoption of: 
a) Effective sanctions, of a kind and at a level adequate 
to deter firms and individuals from participating in 
such cartels; and 
b) Enforcement procedures and institutions with powers 
adequate to detect and remedy hard core cartels, 
including powers to obtain documents and 
information and to impose penalties for non-
compliance.356 
United States antitrust law has had criminal penalties since its inception 
in 1890. Violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act have been 
felonies since 1974.357 Penalties include imprisonment for up to ten years for 
an individual and fines for corporations up to $100,000,000 or the higher of 
double the gain or loss caused by the unlawful conduct.358  
Criminal enforcement is reserved for hardcore violations of section 1 of 
the Sherman Act of agreements between competitors such as price fixing, 
bid rigging, production levels, territorial allocations, and customer 
allocations.359 These violations are deemed per se unreasonable and almost 
always prosecuted as criminal violations.360 Convictions or guilty pleas are 
frequent and sentences average in excess of twenty-four months in prison.361 
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Enforcement in the Obama Administration, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the New York State Bar 
Association, New York, N.Y. (Jan. 30, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/517761/download.  
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While corporations cannot be imprisoned, criminal fines have been imposed 
as high as $500,000,000.362 
Outside the United States, practices vary widely. While most 
jurisdictions condemn hard-core cartels, they differ as to how to punish 
them. A 2015 survey found that more than thirty jurisdictions provide for 
criminal penalties for antitrust violations, but most have done so within the 
past twenty years.363 Few have successfully prosecuted a criminal case and 
fewer still have actually imprisoned a defendant for such a violation. None 
do so as a matter of routine as is the case in the United States. 
There is a vigorous debate outside the United States whether, when, and 
how to impose criminal penalties for competition violations. There are 
reasonable arguments that criminal penalties may not be appropriate for 
certain jurisdictions for substantive, procedural, institutional, or historical 
reasons. Not every system provides for competition enforcement against 
individuals rather than enterprises or undertakings. Not every system has a 
competition agency with the power to directly prosecute a criminal offense, 
and most rely on a more complicated referral and cooperation system with 
the general criminal prosecutor. At the most fundamental level, not every 
system views the violation of competition norms as the type of fraud and 
theft by well-dressed thieves as price fixing is characterized in the United 
States.364 
For example, the EU has a vibrant competition system but the EU Treaty 
does not provide for such criminal penalties or only imposes fines on 
undertakings, rather than individuals. Neither of these bedrock principles is 
likely to change.  
Even a sophisticated competition enforcer like the UK Competition and 
Markets Authority struggles with the rare criminal proceedings it has 
brought to date.365 Countries like Mexico and Australia have only brought 
                                                                                                                     
362 United States v. Hui Hsiung, 758 F.3d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 2014), amended and superseded on 
denial of reh’g en banc, 778 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2015). The Swiss pharmaceutical firm Hoffman La-Roche 
also paid an agreed $500,000,000 fine in an international cartel case involving food additives. Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, F. Hoffman-La Roche and BASF Agree to Pay Record Criminal Fines for 
Participating in International Vitamin Cartel (May 20, 1999). 
363 Gregory C. Shaffer, Nathaniel H. Nesbitt & Spencer Weber Waller, Criminalizing Cartels: A 
Global Trend?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW 301, 3–4 (John Duns, 
Arlen Duke & Brendan Sweeney eds., 2015). 
364 PETER WHELAN, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF EUROPEAN CARTEL ENFORCEMENT: THEORETICAL, 
LEGAL, AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES 25–43 (2014); Andreas Stephan, Survey of Public Attitudes to 
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15-8, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2642181; Peter Whelan, Cartel 
Criminalization and the Challenge of ‘Moral Wrongfulness’, 33 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 538 
(2013). 
365 Cartels 2019 Chapter 11 Criminal Sanctions, GLOBAL LEGAL INSIGHTS, 
https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/cartels-laws-and-regulations/united-kingdom (last 
visited Nov. 29, 2019).  
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their first criminal proceedings in the past two years.366 New Zealand has 
only enacted a criminal competition law provision in 2019.367 
B. Administrative and Civil Fines 
Most other jurisdictions rely instead on civil or administrative fines or 
penalties to enforce against hard core cartel and related behaviors. The EU 
competition regulations allow for fines up to ten percent of the worldwide 
annual turnover of the undertakings found liable.368 This is combined with a 
rebuttable presumption that parent corporations are responsible for the 
violations of their subsidiaries. The result is fines that often exceed those in 
the United States and have included fines as high as 4.3 billion euros.369 This 
is the accepted type of remedy for most competition agencies throughout the 
world. Civil or administrative fines typically are available up to a statutory 
maximum or a percentage of the turnover of the respondent. 
Neither the Antitrust Division nor the FTC can seek fines in civil 
antitrust matters.370 The agencies are limited to civil injunctive relief, which 
can include under certain limited circumstances restitution or disgorgement 
of unlawful overcharges.371 Such creative injunctive remedies are helpful to 
consumers, but are the exception and not the rule. 
The Antitrust Division has another rarely used remedy. Section 4A of 
the Clayton Act allows the government to sue for treble damages for any 
overcharges the federal government paid as the buyer of products or services 
                                                                                                                     
366 See Commonwealth Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (2017) FCA 
876 (Austl.); Solicita COFECE Acción Penal Contra Varias Personas que Pudieron Haberse Coludido en 
la Venta de Bienes en el Sector Salud, Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica [COFECE Asks 
for Criminal Prosecution of Several People Who Could Have Colluded in the Sale of Goods in the Health 
Sector], COFECE (May 2, 2017), https://www.cofece.mx/solicita-cofece-accion-penal-contra-3-
personas-que-de-acuerdo-a-sus-investigaciones-se-coludieron-en-la-venta-de-bienes-en-el-sector-
salud/. 
367 Commerce (Criminalisation of Cartels) Amendment Act 2019 (22-1) (N.Z.). 
368 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 ch. VI, art. 23(2)(c), On the Implementation of the Rules 
on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance), 2003 O.J. (L 
001), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32003R0001&from=En.  
369 European Commission Press Release IP/18/4581, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €4.34 
Billion for Illegal Practices Regarding Android Mobile Devices to Strengthen Dominance of Google’s 
Search Engine, Brussels (July 18, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4581_en.htm; see 
also Case AT.39740, Google Search (Shopping), [2017] 4 C.M.L.R. 12 (imposing a separate two billion 
euro fine for an earlier decision). 
370 Harry First, The Case for Antitrust Civil Penalties, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 127, 127–28 (2009). 
Recently, the chair of the FTC has testified in favor of having such powers. Joe Simons, Chairman, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, Oversight of the Federal Trade Commission at the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
Subcommittee on Digital Commerce and Consumer Protection, United States House of Representatives, 
at 6–7 (July 18, 2018), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1394526/p180101_ftc_testimony_re_ov
ersight_house_07182018.pdf. 
371 FTC v. Abbvie, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 3d 98, 138, 144 (E.D. Pa. 2018). 
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as a result of an antitrust violation.372 Despite the enormous size of 
government purchases and the obvious benefits of treble damages to 
taxpayers, this remedy has been used only sporadically over the years. More 
recently, the head of the Antitrust Division has stated that he intends to use 
such suits on a more regular basis.373 
C. Private Enforcement 
The other critical fault line between the United States and the rest of the 
world is the prevalence of private treble damage rights of action in the U.S. 
Section 4 of the Clayton Act allows all persons injured in their business or 
property as a result of an antitrust violation to sue for treble damages plus 
attorneys’ fees and costs.374 Private persons may also seek injunctive relief, 
declaratory judgments, and assert antitrust violations as affirmative defenses 
or counterclaims if sued.375 
Private antitrust treble damage actions predominate in the United States 
at a scale unknown in other jurisdictions. Depending on the year, the ratio 
of private rights of action to federal government cases may be more than 
twenty to one.376 Many are follow-on cases to government criminal cartel 
cases that are presumptive evidence of a violation in a subsequent private 
case, leaving the private plaintiff to prove only standing and the amount of 
harm.377  
The treble damage remedy in the United States has existed since the 
passage of the Sherman Act in 1890. However, a vast expansion of private 
antitrust litigation took place in the mid-twentieth century because of the 
interaction of various statutory rights and judicial decisions. First, only 
successful plaintiffs, rather than defendants, are entitled to attorneys’ fees 
and costs.378 This distinguishes the antitrust laws from the general U.S. rule 
that parties pay their own fees and costs, as well as the general rule outside 
the United States that all losing parties pay the prevailing party’s fees and 
                                                                                                                     
372 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012). 
373 ANTITRUST SOURCE, ENFORCERS ROUNDTABLE AT THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION 
OF ANTITRUST SPRING MEETING IN WASHINGTON D.C. 23 (2018), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1387878/ohlhausen_-
_enforcers_roundtable_3-30-18_.pdf (transcript available through the American Bar Association) 
(statement of Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division); Barry Nigro, Deputy 
Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Keynote Remarks at the American Bar Association’s Antitrust 
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374 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012).  
375 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2012). 
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A. Foer & Randy M. Stutz eds., 2012). 
377 15 U.S.C. § 5 (2012). 
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costs. Second, normal tort rules about joint and several liability apply, 
making each defendant potentially liable for the full amount of any judgment 
(after trebling).379 However, contribution between tortfeasors is not 
permitted, preventing a defendant from suing its fellow defendants for their 
share of liability.380 Third, antitrust judgments as intentional torts may not 
be insurable, depending on the precise provisions of state law.381 Fourth, 
normal rules about in pari delicto or unclean hands do not apply in antitrust 
litigation and do not bar a party who unwillingly participated in a violation 
from suing to undo an unlawful arrangement or for treble damages where 
applicable.382 Finally, settlements by co-defendants are deductible, but only 
pre-trebling,383 leaving non-settling defendants potentially responsible for 
the vast amount of a treble damage verdict. 
The United States also has general civil procedure rules, unknown in 
other jurisdictions, which strengthen private antitrust litigation. These 
include the federal and state constitutional right to jury trial,384 the 
unpredictability and size of potential jury awards, the extensive system of 
discovery in U.S. civil litigation,385 the availability of contingent fees, and 
the existence of meaningful class actions since the 1960s.386  
At the same time, there has been a judicial and legislative response that 
has narrowed private antitrust somewhat. The courts have created doctrines 
of antitrust standing,387 antitrust injury,388 and bars on indirect purchaser 
actions,389 which have limited both certain types of actions and certain 
categories of plaintiffs. Pleadings requirements have been tightened, first in 
antitrust conspiracy cases,390 and then more generally in all civil litigation.391 
Summary judgment for defendants was made easier for all defendants in a 
                                                                                                                     
379 Tex. Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 646 (1981). 
380 Id. at 646. But judgment sharing agreements are enforceable and agreements to indemnify have 
been held to be enforceable as well. See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 1995 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4738, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 1995) (holding that the “defendants’ judgment sharing 
agreement is not unlawful”). 
381 MITCHELL CHEYETTE & SHAWN PARISH, CALIFORNIA ANTITRUST & UNFAIR COMPETITION 
LAW § 25.02 (Garrett Lindsey ed., 2017) (explaining that “express coverage for antitrust claims is 
generally not included in typical business third-party liability insurance policies”). 
382 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968). 
383 Burlington Indus. v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d 380, 387 (4th Cir. 1982). 
384 U.S. CONST. art. VII.  
385 FED. R. CIV. P. 26–45. 
386 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
387 Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535 
n.31 (1983). 
388 Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342 (1990); Matsushita Elec. Indus. 
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 
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389 Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 225 (1990); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 
720, 724 (1977). 
390 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 552 (2007). 
391 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009). 
 
 
2020] THE OMEGA MAN 187 
trio of cases including a prominent long running antitrust case involving the 
electronics industry.392  
In several circumstances, the Supreme Court has restricted the substance 
of antitrust rules for fear of overenforcement, almost always in the context 
of a private treble damages case.393 At least one recent appellate case has 
suggested that certain jurisdictional aspects of foreign commerce antitrust 
litigation should be narrower in private treble damage actions than in 
government enforcement actions.394 
Requirements for certification of class actions have been tightened,395 
and separate legislation has made it easier for defendants to remove class 
actions from more plaintiff friendly state courts.396 Class actions have been 
eliminated in many instances through the enforcement of arbitration clauses 
requiring only individual claims between the parties.397 
Despite these retrenchments, the uniquely U.S. system for private 
competition law enforcement has been labeled a “toxic cocktail” by 
international commentators.398 No country would dream of adopting the full 
panoply of U.S. civil litigation rights and duties in the antitrust area or more 
generally. Even where private competition law litigation exists, it appears 
very different from its U.S. equivalent. No major jurisdiction has adopted 
treble damages. Most employ a strict loser pays principle. None have the 
                                                                                                                     
392 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 319 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 
242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 577 (1986). 
393 Stephen Calkins, Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, With Special Attention to 
Summary Judgment and Motions to Dismiss, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, NEW 
LEARNING ch. 5 (Lawrence J. White ed., 1988); Stephen Calkins, Reflections on Matsushita and 
“Equilibrating Tendencies”: Lessons for Competition Authorities, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 15, 16 (2018). 
394 Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 826 (7th Cir. 2015). 
395 See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 38 (2013) (holding the class of subscribers was 
improperly certified since the subscribers failed to show that common issues of damages predominated 
in the action as required by F.R.C.P. 23(b)(3)); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 
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requirement under F.R.C.P. 23(a)(2)). 
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member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state and any defendant 
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397 See Am. Express v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 238–39 (2013) (holding that the FAA did 
not permit courts to invalidate a contractual waiver of class arbitration on the ground that a plaintiff’s 
cost of individuality arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeded potential recovery); see also AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act 
preempted California’s Discover Bank Rule); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 
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82 (5th ed. 2014). 
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broad discovery system of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Some 
restrict or bar contingent fees. Few have juries for civil litigation of any kind. 
Most civil law systems rely on a system of judicial sovereignty with the 
judge conducting the proceeding rather than the adversarial system of the 
United States. 
A wide variety of jurisdictions are developing private damage remedies 
in competition law. The EU passed a directive requiring its member states 
to create private rights of action which has recently been implemented by all 
the member states.399 The EU further issued a recommendation on 
“collective actions” designed to create an EU compatible version of class 
action without the perceived excesses of the U.S. system.400 Private rights of 
action, either standing alone or following government action, also exist to 
varying degrees in jurisdictions as diverse as Australia, Canada, Israel, 
China, Chile, Mexico, and many other jurisdictions.401 However, many of 
these private litigation systems exist on paper only or remain in their infancy. 
While the trends for private damage litigation and for class actions 
between the United States and the rest of the world may be slowly 
converging, the chance for a meeting somewhere in the middle remains 
highly unlikely, or at best decades away. For the foreseeable future, the U.S. 
system will remain defined by heavy reliance on private treble damages 
competition litigation. The rest of the world will remain heavily dependent 
on public administrative enforcement with private litigation struggling to 
supplement the primacy of public administrative competition authorities. 
V. FRONTIER ISSUES 
Big data, algorithmic competition, social media, and related high 
technology issues represent some of the frontier issues of competition 
policy.402 A number of competition agencies have begun to marshal 
                                                                                                                     
399 Council Directive 2014/104, 2014 O.J. (L 349) 1 (EC), http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/104/oj 
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resources to address these issues and formulate comprehensive responses to 
mergers and potential abuse of dominance by digital platforms with likely 
market power or dominance in different aspects of social networking, 
internet retailing, internet search, and behavioral advertising. 
Like the prior generation’s investigations and litigation against 
Microsoft for its dominance of operating systems and application software, 
the United States tentative enforcement and remedies have been 
substantially exceeded by the EU, its member states, and certain other 
jurisdictions.  
The most innovative enforcement effort to date is the German 
Bundeskartellampt’s preliminary decision against Facebook finding that the 
company has abused its dominant position in social media by degrading the 
privacy protections that it promised its users.403 This decision was recently 
reversed by the Higher Regional Court with the German Cartel Office 
vowing to appeal to the Federal Court of Justice leaving final resolution of 
the case and the link between privacy and competition unresolved for the 
near future. Although not part of the German case, the recent revelations of 
the Facebook data breach involving Cambridge Analytica’s acquisition of 
personal information of at least eighty-seven million users further highlight 
the importance of the allegations in the German case.404 
Apple’s planned acquisition of the song recognition software company 
Shazam also raises important links between data privacy and competition in 
the EU, which are not yet known to be part of any U.S. merger analysis of 
the transaction.405 The EU announced opening a more detailed second phase 
investigation of the Shazam transaction on the grounds that the transaction 
may allow Facebook to acquire data on users’ relationships with competing 
digital platforms and allow Facebook to adversely affect the competitive 
opportunities of those rivals.406 
                                                                                                                     
403 See Bunderskartellamt Prohibits Facebook from Combining User Data from Different Sources, 
BUNDERSKARTELLAMT (July 2, 2019), 
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The EU’s abuse of dominance case against Google is probably the most 
significant case outside the United States. After a lengthy investigation and 
numerous unsuccessful attempts to reach a settlement, the European 
Commission reached a decision holding that Google had unlawfully abused 
its dominance in the internet search market by demoting the search rankings 
of competing vertical competitors. The Commission fined Google the 
equivalent of more than 2.7 billion dollars and ordered Google to provide 
non-discriminatory placement in search results to competitors going 
forward.407 While Google appeals this decision, the Commission issued a 
new decision imposing a fine of more than five billion dollars in connection 
with Google’s licensing conditions for the Android mobile operating 
system.408 
The EU is taking the issue of digital economy quite seriously and 
undertaking a series of comprehensive studies and measures unlike anything 
occurring in the United States. It began with a General Directive on Data 
Privacy which went into effect in May 2018.409 The European Commission 
also has created plans and a framework for a single digital market for the EU 
as a whole.410 Additionally, the Commission has begun an investigation of 
Amazon’s dual role as merchant and platform operator.411 
The Competition Directorate of the Commission has followed up on 
these developments and created a Digital Advisory Panel to focus on the 
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challenges of digitization for competition policy.412 The UK Competition 
and Markets Authority announced that it will have a specialist data unit 
following the recommendation of the blue ribbon expert panel known as the 
Furman Report.413 The French Autorité de la concurrence and the German 
Bundeskartellamt also have launched a joint project on algorithms and 
competition law.414  
Other jurisdictions and organizations are starting to think systematically 
about the unique challenges to competition law posed by digitization, the 
growth of big data, and other aspects of the internet. The OECD has 
conducted several workshops on these issues.415 The French competition 
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Project on Algorithms and Their Implications on Competition, BUNDESKARTELLAMT (June 19, 2018), 
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2018/19_06_2018_Alg
orithmen.html. 
415 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD REVIEWS OF DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION: 
GOING DIGITAL IN SWEDEN 3 (2018), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/oecd-
reviews-of-digital-transformation-going-digital-in-sweden_9789264302259-en#page1 (examining the 
recent developments in infrastructures for the digital economy, telecom markets, and related regulations 
and policies in Sweden); see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION 
OF THE HEARING ON BIG DATA 2 (2016), 
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/M(2016)2/ANN2/FINAL/en/pdf (“The Hearing on Big 
Data aimed at identifying some of the competition challenges from the increasing use of consumer data 
for business purposes, and to discuss possible reactions by competition authorities and other agencies. 
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agency has completed a market study of online advertising.416 The EU,417 
the Canadian Competition Bureau,418 South Africa,419 the German 
Bundeskartellamt, on its own, and in conjunction with the French 
Competition Authority,420 and the Japanese Fair Trade Commission421 all 
have issued statements or reports outlining their approaches to “big data” as 
competition agencies. The UK has the Furman Report.422 The French and 
German competition agencies have announced a joint project on how to 
classify and analyze algorithms.423 The Australian competition agency has 
announced a Digital Platform Inquiry.424 Most recent, the UK announced the 
                                                                                                                     
416 See Charlotte Breuvart, Eric Barbier de la Serre & Laurent De Muyter, French Competition 
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417 Commission Decision No. 2018/1927, 2018 O.J. (L 313) 39 (EU), https://eur-
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N. 
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LEXOLOGY (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=140bcc47-fd72-44f2-
ba18-e6ac7647785f.  
419 COMPETITION COMM’N S. AFR., DATA SERVICES MARKET INQUIRY: SUMMARY OF 
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Furman). 
423 The French Autorité de la Concurrence and the German Bundeskartellamt Launch a Joint 
Project on Algorithms and their Implications on Competition, BUNDESKARTELLAMT (June 19, 2018), 
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2018/19_06_2018_Alg
orithmen.html.  
424 Rod Sims, Chairman, Australian Competition & Consumer Comm’n, Speech at the International 
Institute of Communications – Telecommunications and Media Forum: Regulating for Competition: 





2020] THE OMEGA MAN 193 
creation of an independent task force to examine competition in digital 
markets.425 
In contrast, the United States has shown caution in enforcement and lack 
of interest in the big data field as a separate policy matter. Most mergers in 
data driven markets have been approved without conditions.426 The FTC 
chose not to bring an expansive case against Google for monopolization and 
unfair methods of competition despite a staff recommendation to do so.427 
Instead, the FTC settled limited charges through an unusual voluntary letter 
agreement rather than a binding consent decree.428 There are no publicly 
available plans for a revived or revised investigation by the FTC, and 
currently  it is a coalition of fifty States and territories which are  
investigating  Google.429   
As of the fall of 2019, no significant U.S. federal cases are underway 
involving the tech giants facing competition scrutiny in multiple 
jurisdictions abroad. The head of the Antitrust Division signaled in 2018 that 
his agency is unlikely to undertake such a case, stating that consumer choice 
rather than antitrust enforcement should guide the evolution of digital 
platforms.430   
                                                                                                                     
425 HM Treasury & The Rt. Hon. Philip Hammond MP, Work Kicks-off to Examine Digital 
Competition in UK, GOV.UK (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/work-kicks-off-
to-examine-digital-competition-in-uk.  
426 See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Federal Trade Commission Closes 
Google/DoubleClick Investigation (Dec. 20, 2007), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2007/12/federal-trade-commission-closes-googledoubleclick-investigation (explaining that no 
conditions were imposed on the Google/DoubleClick merger because there was no chance of competitive 
harm). See Stucke & Grunes, supra note 402, at 69–104 (surveying unchallenged recent merger 
investigation involving big data). 
427 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding 
Google’s Search Practices In the Matter of Google Inc. FTC File Number 111-0163 (Jan. 3, 2013), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/statement-commission-regarding-
googles-search-practices/130103brillgooglesearchstmt.pdf. See also Jamie Condliffe, Leaked 2012 
Report Says FTC Staff Wished to Sue Google Over Result Skews, GIZMODO (Mar. 20, 2015), 
https://gizmodo.com/new-leaked-report-describes-how-ftc-staff-wanted-to-sue-1692564840 (stating 
that the FTC initially wanted to sue Google for “skewing” searches). 
428 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Google Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to Resolve 
FTC Competition Concerns in the Markets for Devices Like Smart Phones, Games and Tablets, and in 
Online Search (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/01/google-agrees-
change-its-business-practices-resolve-ftc. An unrelated portion of the case was settled through a binding 
consent decree involving the licensing of standard essential patents relating to cell phone technology that 
Google acquired through a prior acquisition from Motorola. Id. 
429 Associated Press, Google Faces Antitrust Investigation by 50 U.S. States and Territories, 
GUARDIAN  (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/sep/09/google-antitrust-
investigation-monopoly. 
430 See David McLaughlin, Trump Antitrust Chief Says no Sign of Competitive Harm from Tech, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-28/trump-antitrust-
chief-says-no-sign-of-competitive-harm-from-tech (“Major online platforms have significant market 
power, but the question for antitrust enforcers is whether or not they’re taking steps to stifle innovations 
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In the past year, the U.S. rhetoric has somewhat changed,431 but not the 
enforcement record. The FTC has created a high tech taskforce to explore 
future options.432 In addition, the U.S. enforcement agencies have agreed 
that the Antitrust Division will conduct any resulting investigations of 
Google and Apple, while the FTC will conduct any investigations of 
Amazon and Facebook.433 Any enforcement actions would be in the medium 
to long term and would be subject to the narrower U.S. vision of the abuse 
of market power versus the more expansive EU toolkit in this area. 
A simple recent illustration of this digital divide in antitrust enforcement 
took place in separate interviews by the head of the Antitrust Division and 
the Competition Directorate of the EU. Makan Delrahim gave an interview 
to the Financial Times where he stated that the tech giants were a source of 
“great efficiencies.”434 In contrast, Margethe Vestager of the EU stated that 
if there’s no regulation, “you have just the laws of the jungle and not the 
laws of democracy.”435 
VI. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
The isolation of U.S. antitrust across many key substantive, procedural, 
and institutional aspects affects our interactions with the rest of the 
competition law community. This Section explores how we got here and its 
normative implications. 
A. History and Culture 
Much of the growing and persistent isolation of U.S. antitrust is a 
function of history and path dependence. Antitrust in the United States began 
at the state level in the 1880s with the federal government following a decade 
                                                                                                                     
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-keynote-
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432 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC’s Bureau of Competition Launches Task Force to 
Monitor Technology Markets (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
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regulation/.  
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later with the Sherman Act.436 The open-ended, broadly worded, almost 
constitutional, language of the Sherman Act was a product of its times and 
the U.S. common law system. While the United States has been influential 
to varying degrees in the adoption of other jurisdictions’ competition 
systems, the other systems all were adopted or modified into their modern 
forms much later and in very different legal and societal climates.437 There 
is no reason to think that copying the United States was the principal reason 
for their outcome or evolution.438 
There is every reason to believe that most competition systems around 
the world have emulated the EU rather than the United States. Competition 
law is part of the “acquis communautaire” that all member states are required 
to incorporate into their own national law.439 All current member states have 
national competition law that closely tracks the competition laws of the EU 
and may not conflict with its core provisions.440 Special provisions also 
allow member states to have broader laws regarding abuse of a dominant 
position.441 
Many of these competition provisions were explicitly adopted by 
countries in order to facilitate eventual membership in the EU. Other 
countries adopted EU style provisions out of necessity or choice in 
connection with their membership in the EU or the European Free Trade 
Agreement, or to secure preferential trade agreements with the EU.442 Still 
others have colonial or cultural ties with EU countries that made EU style 
competition law a more natural fit.  
Even Japan and Germany, where the United States exerted more direct 
influence following the end of World War II, quickly modified their original 
                                                                                                                     
436 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). 
437 See Amedeo Arena, The Relationship Between Antitrust and Regulation in the US and the EU: 
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competition laws to fit their indigenous needs and diverged from whatever 
U.S. roots from which they grew.443 If there is a competition for the hearts 
and minds of the world’s one hundred thirty plus competition systems, the 
EU has long since acquired a dominant position. 
Two recent examples illustrate this type of divergence where very 
different jurisdictions either adopted or modified their competition laws 
ultimately adopting language and approaches developed for their national 
needs more in line with EU competition principles. More than fifteen years 
ago, China began a systematic study of world competition systems to 
develop its first competition law as part of the promotion of its socialist 
market economy. Scholars note that the PRC relied on key EU, and less so 
U.S., concepts and sources in selecting the rules, procedures, and institutions 
that best suited their needs.444  
Chile also has modified its competition laws in recent years. The new 
statutory language echoes that of Articles 101 and 102, even though key 
concepts remain undefined by guidelines or precedent. For example, Article 
3(a), amended in 2016, prohibits agreements or concerted practices that 
involve competitors and consist of fixing sale or purchase prices, limit 
production, allow them to assign market zones or quotas, or affect the result 
of bidding processes, as well as agreements or concerted practices that 
confer them market power, consist in determining marketing conditions, or 
that exclude competitors.445 Article 3(b) incorporates the familiar EU notion 
of abuse of dominance.446 
The dominance of EU style competition policy seems unlikely to abate. 
Similarly, it is difficult to see which jurisdiction has bucked, or is likely to 
buck, that trend and adopt the narrow substantive, procedural, institutional, 
and remedial U.S. approach as its playbook for competition policy. 
B. Ideology 
Some of the enduring and increasing isolation of United States antitrust 
in the world community also is a function of ideology. As Professor Eleanor 
Fox has noted: 
In the matter of single-firm conduct, the U.S., especially as 
recited in the Trinko case, is laissez faire; it makes 
assumptions that the EU does not make. The default 
presumptions are very powerful. For example: if you are 
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acting as a single firm (not in conspiracy with competitors), 
you’re probably going to do what’s best for the market if 
government leaves you alone. That is because (the 
assumptions go) markets work well and will punish you if you 
try to harm competition.447 
Taking the U.S. agencies and courts at their word, the sole or principal 
objective of U.S. antitrust is the promotion of consumer welfare defined in 
a narrow price theory fashion.448 While many commentators dispute whether 
this is true historically or desirable normatively, this is the gospel that the 
U.S. agencies preach in their dealings with other jurisdictions.  
The United States has pursued a policy of promoting its view of best 
practices to other jurisdictions in a variety of fora. First, the United States 
worked to oppose the inclusion of competition rules in the WTO 
negotiations because of concern that binding rules would be adopted that 
differed from U.S. practice and interests.449 Instead, the United States 
promoted the creation of the International Competition Network (ICN), a 
virtual organization that would be voluntary, consensus driven, and focused 
on development of best practices.450 The United States has worked through 
both government agency personnel and non-governmental advisers to 
promote its view of best practices to varying degrees of success since the 
creation of the ICN over both Republican and Democratic administrations.  
From this perspective, the ICN report card is mixed. As noted 
throughout this Paper, the ICN often has documented the diversity of 
competition law practice rather than promote the substantive convergence 
of competition hoped for by U.S. interests. The ICN has been very valuable 
as a teaching tool and as a forum for the sharing of information and practice 
among diverse jurisdictions, but it has not resulted in most jurisdictions 
becoming a mirror for the United States. More often than not, other 
jurisdictions enforce their own competition laws knowledgeably and 
effectively but do not do so by adopting the existing U.S. approach.  
A similar pattern exists in the other U.S. interactions in international 
organizations, regional trade arrangements, and bilateral relationships in the 
competition sphere. This is the case at the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), where most of the members follow the 
EU, rather than the U.S., model for competition matters.451 It is true at the 
                                                                                                                     
447 See Keyte, supra note 354, at 24–25. 
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United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which 
is dedicated to the interests of smaller and developing jurisdictions.452 It is 
similarly the case at The World Bank which views competition law as part 
of a developmental agenda.453  
A cursory review of the work product of important organizations such 
as the ICN and the OECD shows the diversity of opinion on a plethora of 
key competition issues. Two surveys help illustrate the extent of the 
divergence. The first survey relates to the goals of competition law itself. 
That survey notes that a majority of the respondents identified the promotion 
of consumer welfare as only one of several goals for competition law.454 
A second ICN survey on unilateral conduct provisions similarly shows 
the wide gulf between U.S. practice and the rest of the world. The survey 
begins with a list of ten different goals for single firm conduct provisions 
which include: 
1) Ensuring an effective competitive process; 
2) Promoting consumer welfare; 
3) Maximizing efficiency; 
4) Ensuring economic freedom; 
5) Ensuring a level playing field for small and medium 
size enterprises; 
6) Promoting fairness and equality; 
7) Promoting consumer choice; 
8) Achieving market integration; 
9) Facilitating privatization and market liberalization; 
and 
10) Promoting competitiveness in international 
markets.455 
Not all of the isolation of U.S. antitrust is related to the rejection of 
economic analysis, or the preferencing of other normative values such as the 
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single market imperative, ordoliberalism, promotion of democratic values, 
or notions of industrial policy embedded within competition law systems. 
Even within the economic community, U.S. economists tend to be more 
favorable to economic ideas based on free trade and market competition than 
their British, French, or German peers.456 The same appears to true for U.S. 
society as a whole in comparison to its EU counterparts.457 
Most of the discourse in these fora is civil and sophisticated. Countries 
have learned much from each other as to best practices and achieved limited 
harmonization in certain areas.458 More often than not, the United States 
remains a seller, rather than a buyer, and frequently comes home empty 
handed. 
Other times, U.S. frustration with other jurisdictions’ conduct bubbles 
over both in public and private. These incidents have arisen in both 
Republican and Democratic administrations and generally fall in one of 
three camps. The foreign enforcer (often the EU) often is criticized for not 
applying sound economics; protecting competitors, and not competition; 
taking action when the U.S. agencies have refrained or limited their actions; 
or applying competition law in a discriminatory manner against a U.S. 
respondent.459  
The main source of antitrust enforcement strife between the United 
States and the European Union during the Clinton Administration came with 
the difference in opinion regarding the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger. 
This merger was cleared in the United States largely on the grounds that the 
merger would not likely cause a substantial lessening of competition because 
of the weakening over time of McDonnell-Douglas’s market position.460 The 
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transatlantic controversy began when the EU threatened to block the merger 
entirely and ultimately imposed substantial conditions on its approval.461 
President Clinton expressed his concerns about the European 
Commission’s reasons for opposing the merger and noted that it would be 
“unfortunate” if the United States entered into a trade standoff with the 
EC.462 Clinton also speculated about going to the World Trade Organization 
or sanctioning European countries if the European Commission continued 
opposing the merger.463 
President Clinton also noted that the EU appeared to be making a 
political decision to protect Airbus. Clinton stated, “the Europeans have 
more people living on their continent than we do in the United States, and I 
don’t believe Airbus has an effective competitor in Europe.”464 Top 
administration officials, including United States Trade Representative 
Charlene Barshefsky and Commerce Secretary William Daley, hinted at 
U.S. retaliation if the EU continued to oppose the merger.465 
The first major antitrust enforcement disagreement between the United 
States and the EU occurred during the Bush Administration over the 
proposed merger between GE and Honeywell. This was the first time that 
foreign regulators fully blocked a proposed merger between two U.S. 
companies. President George W. Bush noted that he wanted U.S. companies 
to be treated fairly in Europe and that he was concerned that the European 
Commission was making their decisions in an effort to appease Airbus.466 
President Bush also questioned the European Commission’s demand that 
GE sell off several of its aircraft engineering units after the Canadian and 
U.S. regulators had already approved the deal.467 
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After the EU announced its decision, Treasury Secretary Paul H. O’Neill 
fervently criticized the outcome as “off the wall.”468 Senators John D. 
Rockefeller and Ernest F. Hollings “warned that thwarting the merger would 
damage transatlantic relations and compel retaliatory action by 
Washington.”469 
President Bush’s Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Charles A. 
James, voiced his criticism of the EU’s GE/Honeywell decision in a series 
of speeches.470 Immediately after the decision, James stated that “[c]lear and 
longstanding U.S. antitrust policy holds that the antitrust laws protect 
competition, not competitors,” and that this EU decision represented a 
“significant point of divergence.”471 On September 21, 2001, James made 
another speech in which he criticized the so-called “portfolio effects” 
analysis employed by the EU as “antithetical to the goals of antitrust law 
enforcement.”472 Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust 
Division William Kolasky reiterated those views in a November 2001 
speech.473 Kolasky again criticized the “portfolio effects” approach of the 
EU and also chastised it for focusing on the mixed bundling theory as a 
means of coming to its decision.474  
The Bush Administration also criticized the EU and Korean Microsoft 
decisions. Shortly after the EU’s imposition of sanctions, Senate Majority 
Leader Bill Frist condemned the Commission’s action. Claiming that 
Europe’s economies were stagnant because of huge debt, taxes, and 
crippling business regulation in Brussels, Mr. Frist stated that the “European 
Commission has taken aim at Microsoft, a company whose products and 
technology have been engines of global economic growth.”475  
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R. Hewitt Pate, then head of the Antitrust Division, said the 
Commission’s demand that a Windows version be offered without the media 
player went too far and expressed concerns that “imposing code removal 
remedies” could potentially produce unintended consequences down the 
road. He also reiterated Charles James’s argument from the GE/Honeywell 
case by mentioning that “sound antitrust policy must avoid chilling 
innovation and competition even by dominant companies.”476 
President Obama was equally critical of the European Commission’s 
investigation of Google’s alleged policy of “favoring its search results over 
those of competitors.”477 His primary criticism of the European Union’s 
decision was that the EU was motivated in this decision by the commercial 
interests of its tech companies who struggle to compete with larger 
American rivals, such as Google.478 He claimed that the EU was “hiding 
protectionism behind a veil of principle” and suggested that the true blame 
in this difference in policy lies within protectionist European firms and 
governments because they cannot possibly compete fairly against the United 
States.479 
The Ireland/Apple state aid deal dispute arose at the end of the Obama 
Administration and continues to play a role in the Trump Administration’s 
policy decisions. The United States Treasury Department said that this 
punishment jeopardized “the important spirit of economic partnership 
between the U.S. and the E.U.”480 Chuck Schumer called it a “cheap money 
grab” by the European Commission that targeted U.S. businesses and the 
U.S. tax base.481 The Trump Administration responded by unsuccessfully 
seeking to intervene in Apple’s appeal of the Commission’s order.482 Other 
recent EU state aid tax investigations include Amazon, McDonald’s, 
Starbucks, and Google and are bound to generate similar controversy.483 
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Most recently, President Trump tweeted his displeasure at the EU’s five 
billion dollar fine of Google in connection with its Android licensing 
practices.484 Undoubtedly, more tweets and more traditional and diplomatic 
criticisms will unfold as Google and other U.S. corporations continue to 
draw enforcement actions and penalties for conduct that the United States 
chooses not to challenge or treats more leniently. 
C. Exclusion from the Conversation 
There is a robust and ongoing conversation among governments and 
non-governmental experts about competition law, policy, institutions, 
remedies, and norms. That conversation takes place in international 
organizations, bilateral consultations, cooperation between agencies on 
individual enforcement matters, technical assistance with newer and smaller 
competition agencies, bar associations, industry groups, universities, think 
tanks, conferences, legal publications, and in legal, business, and general 
interest publications.485 
The United States is, and should be, part of that conversation. We have 
a proud history and a record of great accomplishment. However, the rest of 
the world is less subject to U.S. pressure and less interested in U.S. 
recommendations that are rooted in the history and present policies of the 
United States if these ideas do not meet the needs of the other jurisdictions. 
At the same time, the rest of the world has an increasingly deep and 
impressive track record of enforcement, as well as legal and policy 
innovations of their own. If the antitrust community is going to continue to 
have a productive dialogue and not a series of one-way speeches, then a 
number of changes must occur. These changes include a recognition of 
difference, a greater appreciation for listening, the need for two-way 
learning, a recognition of the limits of deep harmonization, and a 
fundamentally different role for the United States on the international stage. 
1. Look Before You Leap 
For decades, the United States has been a vigorous salesman for the 
principles embodied in the Sherman Act.486 It is not clear how successful it 
has been of late. It is also not clear why most jurisdictions should adopt a 
particular position or practice of the United States in their own competition 
law without great care and caution. The slow, complicated adoption of 
criminal cartel enforcement in certain jurisdictions (and rejection in others) 
illustrates the need to tailor concepts appropriate to one legal culture before 
implementation in another setting.  
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2. Avoid Bullying 
There is a significant difference between not understanding how the 
United States approaches a particular competition issue and fully 
understanding what is being advocated, but not agreeing with the proposal. 
The knowledge and sophistication of enforcers, practitioners, and academics 
around the world suggest that the latter is the case far more than the former. 
As Oliver Wendell Holmes once observed: “[Y]ou can not argue a man into 
liking a glass of beer.”487 
The United States has made its case forcefully and often to the 
international antitrust community. It should continue to do so when it 
believes that the national interest so dictates. But decades into the 
international antitrust game, the world is now pretty much divided into those 
who like the U.S. beer and those who do not. 
There is a different model that derives from the field of community 
organizing of social work. In past decades, well-meaning community 
organizers were often the voice of oppressed or powerless communities, 
teaching them what they needed and how to get it. In more recent times, a 
newer model has emerged where the goal is not to be the voice for another 
community but to support them in finding their voice and be an ally as they 
advocate on their own behalf.488 
3. Learn to Listen 
Perhaps it is time for the United States in the international antitrust arena 
to “talk less, smile more.”489 Building on the analogy from the world of 
community organizing, we are at, or rapidly arriving at, the point in global 
antitrust discourse where the United States should advocate less for what it 
wants and listen more to the hopes and needs of other jurisdictions and how 
to help them achieve their own goals. 
There is still an important role for the United States (and other developed 
jurisdictions) to play in providing technical assistance and other forms of 
training to the smaller, newer, and poorer antitrust jurisdictions around the 
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world. These jurisdictions seek to enforce their laws often with minimal 
resources and experience. Bilateral, regional, and international fora can be a 
vital tool for workshops on how to do the work of competition enforcement 
better. But better often means actively listening to determine the needs of 
beneficiaries and helping them find their voice, not echoing the voice of 
another. 
4. Listen to Learn 
It may also be time for the United States to consider being a buyer, rather 
than seller, in the arena of antitrust policy. It has been decades since the 
United States was the world’s policeman for antitrust. For better or worse, 
that honor now goes to the EU for the foreseeable future if the hands-off 
attitude of the United States toward the issue of single firm conduct 
continues. 
Is there really nothing the United States can learn from the more than 
sixty years of EU competition law, or the nearly thirty years since the 
flowering of global antitrust regimes in the wake of the fall of the Soviet 
Union? One starting point may be the value of applying competition law to 
restraints in the public sector or involving firms receiving special privileges 
from the state. Anticompetitive state and local restrictions may be less of an 
issue in the United States compared to countries with a history of socialism 
or state-planned economies, but it is not a negligible problem. It is also one 
which unusually tends to unite antitrust conservatives and liberals as an issue 
worth tackling. 
It would probably take congressional action to overturn the antitrust 
state action doctrine as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown 
and its progeny.490 There also is uncharted territory involving the 
interpretation of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment as 
another possible source of state authority to impede competition.491 
The FTC has begun down this path without expressly relying on the 
many sources of comparative competition law to support its efforts to narrow 
the state action doctrine. It has brought selected antitrust enforcement 
actions which have resulted in the Supreme Court raising the bar for 
successful invocation of state action immunity.492 At the same time, it has 
also resulted in certain state legislatures more explicitly mandating the 
anticompetitive results and processes to satisfy the new Supreme Court 
standards, making it hard to determine the net results in the real world.493 
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For the past several years, the FTC has also begun an “economic liberty” 
project as a competition advocate for the removal of state and local restraints 
on competition that harm consumers even if protected by the state action 
doctrine as currently understood.494  
Perhaps it is time to use the collective experience of the rest of the world 
as an additional argument for the benefits of this approach. The United States 
is not the only federal system in the world to confront the issue of the limits 
of the authority of constituent states or provinces. The United States has 
never highly valued comparative law in the competition sphere, or in 
general. Perhaps now is the time to employ this new type of learning and 
argumentation in both its litigation and advocacy strategies to diminish harm 
to competition from an entire sector of the economy only partially subject to 
the normal rules of the competitive market. 
Even if the U.S. agencies are not receptive to the explicit reference to 
comparative competition norms, the courts may be another fertile arena for 
learning from international practice. It is highly unusual for any U.S. court 
or agency to cite foreign law or practice in the antitrust field except as 
background information to deciding an issue on purely U.S. grounds.495 This 
was once a necessity as the United States was nearly alone in having a 
mature body of antitrust learning and precedent. It is no longer the case. The 
divergence and diversity of doctrine and practice set forth in this Article 
provide many fertile avenues for consideration in improving our own laws, 
procedures, institutions, and remedies. Learning and best practices should 
be a two-way street and a true form of regulatory humility in moving toward 
best practices based on a body of global experience where the United States 
is often the outlier. 
5. Be Aware of New Rhetorical Strategies 
Rhetoric, discourse, and language are important tools to channel 
conversation, close off paths for discussions, categorize contending points 
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of view as beyond the pale, and define the shape of disciplines.496 They can 
be both tools of reaction and revolution.497  
United States officials and commentators are employing a variety of 
relatively new rhetorical strategies in response to new movements in U.S. 
antitrust and the continuing developments on the international and global 
front. Many of these strategies seem innocuous or even self-evident. Many 
of these suggestions even contain important kernels of truth. 
At the same time, most of these strategies represent an attempt to 
maintain the primacy of a normative and theoretical position about how to 
operate the antitrust enterprise and an attempt to justify the relative inaction 
of the United States in enforcing types of causes of action that are 
commonplace in other jurisdictions. It will be interesting to follow how the 
continuing international dialogue between the United States and the rest of 
the world embraces or rejects some of the rhetorical justifications of the U.S. 
status quo. 
i. Hipster Antitrust 
Figures from former U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch to former FTC 
Commissioner Joshua Wright have derided hipster antitrust as anything that 
argues against increased economic concentration and its effects on 
employment, wages, technological progress, abuse of power, and other 
societal ills.498 It is not clear exactly what hipster antitrust is or whether it is 
a bad thing. In general, a hipster can be defined “as a person who follows 
the latest trends and fashions, especially those regarded as being outside the 
cultural mainstream.”499 
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Hipster can also mean artisanal, custom, uniquely created products and 
services for discerning customers. That suggests the antitrust enterprise is 
not one size fits all and should be crafted with the needs of the customer in 
mind, rather than the purveyor. 
This intended epithet is invoked primarily to denigrate anything and 
anyone that criticizes the wealth maximization paradigm favored by Robert 
Bork and his disciples.500 More polite discourse on these topics tends to 
characterize critics of Borkian antitrust as neo-Brandeisians, but still 
dismisses such concerns as either unworkable in practice or beyond the 
proper boundaries of antitrust.501 Either way, dismissing fundamental 
critiques of one view of the work of antitrust, primarily associated with the 
United States, misses the current state of the world, which approaches 
competition law and policy with a broader palate of tools and approaches. 
ii. Evidence-Based Antitrust 
A somewhat similar group of commentators argues in favor of evidence-
based antitrust.502 At the most banal level, it is hard to argue with the need 
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for evidence that supports the allegations underlying an investigation or 
decision. But when one drills down below the surface, this rhetorical ploy is 
another way of preferring inaction to action. Such a view favors avoiding 
type I errors versus type II errors, assumes markets will self-correct quickly, 
and promotes the view that any form of enforcement risks making things 
worse rather than better.503 
Scratch a little deeper and the ideological roots of these arguments 
become more apparent. For some critics, there is simply never enough 
evidence to support a past, present, or future enforcement action. For others, 
a strong commitment to Borkian antitrust theory results in the preferencing 
of one type of evidence over others, or the dismissal of record evidence of 
competitive harm when not in line with a theoretical commitment. The 
rhetoric of evidence-based antitrust masks a set of positions and arguments 
that may or may not represent the present or future of U.S. antitrust. It is 
aimed primarily at domestic consumption and ill-suited for other 
jurisdictions with a very different past and present for competition law and 
policy. 
iii. Regulatory Humility 
Former FTC chair Maureen Olhausen, among others, has argued for 
“regulatory humility” as a guide star for competition policy.504 Again, on the 
surface, this seems both sensible and innocuous. No one wants a bureaucrat 
or agency with an enormous ego acting out with a vengeance. However, 
scratching even the surface of such rhetoric reveals a similar policy 
preference for inaction, lack of regulation, reliance on markets, and various 
policy positions that are laissez faire in nature, but largely unrelated to 
humility in any normal sense of the word. It is not a humility born out of a 
need to faithfully execute a mission set by the legislature. It is not a humility 
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born out of a desire to respect precedent. It is not a humility born out of a 
need to match policy preferences to the evidence in a case. 
Humility by agencies or courts is thus orthogonal to the policy 
preferences of whether to open an investigation, initiate a proceeding, or 
reach a decision. It is not a sign of humility to reverse (or continue) the 
policies of a prior administration; it is a sign of belief in the correctness of 
one’s position on the merits of the issue. It is hardly convincing to similarly 
situated enforcers outside of the body politic, who view enforcement of the 
law as set forth in their system as their humble duty.  
iv. Due Process and Procedural Fairness 
The most sympathetic arguments of the new rhetoric of U.S. antitrust is 
the need for greater due process and procedural fairness.505 Due process is a 
hallmark of procedural democracy enshrined in the constitutions, treaties, 
regulations, and administrative laws of most jurisdictions. Enforcement, 
inaction, or a decision based on corruption, favoritism, or discrimination is 
an anathema to justice. By themselves, calls for greater transparency and due 
process are hard to argue with in the abstract. The ICN has adopted twelve 
general principles for procedural fairness in antitrust matters.506 At the same 
time, the United States is leading the charge to negotiate a broader and more 
precise global framework covering most of the world’s competition 
jurisdictions.507  
Concerns remain that these talks are aimed at strengthening the hand of 
the U.S. government when U.S. firms are subject to foreign proceedings.508 
It will be interesting to observe how these tools will be used when there are 
decisions against U.S. firms as either plaintiffs or defendants in mature 
democratic foreign regimes and when U.S. agencies and courts render 
antitrust decisions affecting foreign firms as either plaintiffs or defendants. 
The line between procedure and substance often can be hard to discern. 
                                                                                                                     
505 Introduction to ANTITRUST PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 1, 1–2 (D. Daniel Sokol & Andrew T. 
Guzman eds., 2019). 
506 ICN Guiding Principles for Procedural Fairness in Competition Agency Enforcement, INT’L 
COMPETITION NETWORK, http://icn2018delhi.in/images/AEWG-Guiding-Principles-4PF.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2019); see generally Chris Townley, Mariana Tavares & Mattia Guidi, Influence in the 
International Competition Network (ICN): Who Seeks It, How Do They Do This and Why? 4 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3415067 (describing the 
International Competition Network’s work to propose “superior standards and procedures in competition 
policy”).  
507 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, New Multilateral Framework on Procedures Approved by 
the International Competition Network (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/new-multilateral-
framework-procedures-approved-international-competition-network.  
508 Victoria Graham, Global Antitrust Standards Talks Continue Despite Trade Conflict, 
BLOOMBERG L. NEWS, July 11, 2018 (Remarks of Stephen Calkins). 
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CONCLUSION 
This has been an article about difference rather than the wisdom of the 
choices made. Competition law outside the United States is well developed, 
but very different in many respects. Competition law as a field is defined by 
a common set of concerns at the highest level of generalities that agreements 
between undertakings (particularly cartels) pose a risk of harming 
competition, that the behavior of dominant firms can be a concern, and that 
certain mergers and acquisitions can harm competition. Scratch below that 
surface and a growing series of divergences quickly appears. Many do not 
affect how a particular case comes out in a particular jurisdiction or how 
jurisdictions can profitably cooperate with each other without contention to 
do their jobs better. 
 Regardless of what goals or outcomes one favors for antitrust law and 
policy in the United States, this Article argues that the U.S. system is 
fundamentally different from its international counterparts. In some ways, 
those differences are as stark as the day and night worlds of The Omega 
Man’s world, even if they are less dramatic. 
In a fundamental way, we are dealing with two different worldviews 
about the realities of a global economy. For better or worse, the U.S. system 
is litigation driven before juries and generalist judges. It is heavily invested 
in criminal enforcement and contains multiple centers of federal, state, and 
private enforcement. The U.S. system is more concerned about 
overenforcement rather than underenforcement and operates with a far 
smaller toolkit than many of its global counterparts. Outside the United 
States, competition law more often has a broader vision and toolkit for what 
is deemed within the purview of competition policy. International 
competition law is increasingly focused on scrutinizing tech giants and is 
centered in unitary competition agencies. It is administrative in nature, with 
large fines as the principal enforcement tool, and is less bound up in the 
rhetoric of overenforcement. It is subject to deferential judicial review and 
has only embryonic private enforcement. 
These two ways of looking at the world of competition law and policy 
largely co-exist, but occasionally conflict. The dream of deep substantive 
harmonization appears to be receding, rather than advancing, despite the 
commendable work of organizations like the International Competition 
Network, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. But the 
enduring differences go beyond substantive doctrine and include procedure, 
institutions, remedies, ideologies, and the very boundaries of the purview of 
antitrust and competition. 
History, culture, ideology, and even inertia suggest that these are two 
fundamentally different ways of approaching an important issue of 
international economic law that is unlikely to change anytime soon. There 
may not be many active day-to-day conflicts between such differing views, 
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but there will be conflicting burdens on private parties, increased costs of 
navigating different systems, and specific disagreements that generate much 
heat and light. 
It is fair to discuss and debate whether a given law, procedure, 
institution, or remedy can be improved, but there are no universal solutions 
for all but the most mundane issues. The United States is not as isolated as 
Robert Neville in The Omega Man, but it is still an outlier. Whether in terms 
of population or GDP, the vast majority of the rest of the world has 
competition law. It just isn’t ours. We may be an early adopter of 
competition law, but we are not alone. We are legend. 
 
